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I. INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship provides a path to prosperity for many people.1 In
particular, women and minorities prefer entrepreneurship as their path to
achieve the American Dream.2 In their striving, their startups and small
businesses benefit our entire society.3 Entrepreneurial innovation has a
positive impact on social welfare.4 For these reasons, the federal government
has implemented numerous policies designed to support small businesses
and promote startup innovation.5
However, these policies appear to be inadequate. Recent studies have
shown that startups and small businesses are less successful than large,
incumbent firms.6 Despite what the shows Shark Tank and Silicon Valley
depict, outside of certain high-tech fields, American entrepreneurship
is declining.7

1. Entrepreneurship is the ability to “make something” of oneself. As coined in
1931 by John T. Adams, entrepreneurship symbolized the democratization of opportunity
that is the American Dream. Rebecca Gill, The Evolution of Organizational Archetypes:
From the American to the Entrepreneurial Dream, 80 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 331, 337 (2013).
2. See Alicia M. Robb, Entrepreneurial Performance by Women and Minorities:
The Case of New Firms, 7 J. DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 383, 383–97 (2002).
3. Entrepreneurship positively impacts social welfare in two ways: by major
innovations that shock the equilibrium through creation of a new product or process, which
is also referred to as Schumpeterian entrepreneurship or creative destruction, and by minor
innovations that bring the market price close to equilibrium, which may be called Kirzner
entrepreneurship. See Samuel Bostaph, Schumpeter vs. Kirzner on Entrepreneurs, MISES
INST. (May 16, 2019), https://mises.org/wire/schumpeter-vs-kirzner-entrepreneurs [https://
perma.cc/D2GY-YRFP]; see also infra Part III.
4. See Bill Conerly, Innovation Benefits Society, Not Just the Rich, FORBES (Oct.
21, 2018, 7:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2018/10/21/innovationbenefits-beyond-the-filthy-rich/#22d61feb6a6a [https://perma.cc/8CYK-GT4B]; see also
William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and
Measurement 1, 34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10433, 2004),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w10433.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAU-RFXG] (“Using data
from the U.S. nonfarm business section, I estimate that innovators are able to capture about
2.2 percent of the total social surplus from innovation.”).
5. See Lewis D. Solomon & Garry S. Grossman, Tax and Non-Tax Policies to
Promote Capital Formation: Stimulating High Technology in the 1980’s, 1 AM. J. TAX POL’Y
63, 115 (1982).
6. See Jeremy Quittner, The American Dream is Dying: How Entrepreneurs Can
Change That, INC. (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/milstein-commissionand-salvaging-the-american-dream.html [https://perma.cc/E6UV-Z2PC]; Steve Case, Can
Startups Save the American Dream?, CASE FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2015), https://casefoundation.org/
blog/can-startups-save-american-dream/ [https://perma.cc/Z9XJ-AUJ2].
7. See Philip Aldrick, With Startups Declining, the American Dream is Beginning
to Fade, TIMES (July 2, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/with-startupsdeclining-the-american-dream-isbeginning-to-fade-k8grswhv5 [https://perma.cc/NTS7-ABC2].

758

ORANBURG_57-3_PRE_ORANBURG_PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 57: 757, 2020]

10/16/2020 11:51 AM

Regulatory Democratization
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The decline of entrepreneurship and its counterpart, innovation,8 could
well be the result of over-regulation. It is axiomatic that innovation is
harder, slower, and less successful in highly regulated industries.9 Legal
scholars have suggested that this phenomenon might be explained by the
distributional effects of regulation: although well-intentioned lawmakers
might try to devise regulatory regimes that support entrepreneurs, the larger
incumbents in the market are more able to influence and benefit from the
regulatory process.10 Therefore, regulations by nature are at odds with startup
innovation.11
This argument is incomplete. It is right insofar as studies show that higher
regulation is correlated with lower innovation.12 However, this argument
is wrong in that it collapses all different sorts of regulations into one.
This Article will show that not all regulations are created equal. Instead,
regulations can be more precisely categorized across two axes: complex
versus simple, and rules versus standards.13 This more nuanced analysis
of regulation, split into four categories, reveals that some categories of
regulation are more likely to impact entrepreneurial innovation than others.
Moreover, this provides some hope that smart regulation can provide an
optimal middle ground between over-regulation and over-deregulation.14

8. See Parimal Merchant, Why Innovation and Entrepreneurship Go Hand in Hand,
Entrepreneur (May 21, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/313753 [https://
perma.cc/9ULP-N2GS?type=image] (“Entrepreneurs innovate.”).
9. See Naoimi Fried, Innovating in a Highly Regulated Industry Like Health Care,
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 12, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/innovating-in-a-highly-regulatedindustry-like-health-care [https://perma.cc/J535-PTXN] (“Innovating in regulated industries
takes longer than in other industries. . . . Expect setbacks. Innovation is rarely easy, especially
in regulated industries.”).
10. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, The Cost of Inexperience, 69 ALA. L. REV. 859, 863–64
(2018) (“[R]egulations have the potential of affecting newcomers more perversely than
old-timers. . . . This observation reveals regressive regulatory barriers.”).
11. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 280 (2010)
(“Firms that can better manage transaction costs can better manage regulatory costs, shifting
the burden of those regulatory costs on to those that cannot.”).
12. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REGULATORY REFORM AND
INNOVATION 19, https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2102514.pdf [https://perma.cc/S994-R9PV].
For example, a long-term international study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) found that far fewer patents were issued for telecommunications
innovations in countries where the telecommunications industry is subject to more regulation—
Germany and France—as compared to countries where telecommunications are subject
to greater competition—the United States and Japan. See id.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
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This requires a more detailed analysis of the impact of complex standards,
simple standards, simple rules, and complex rules.
Complex standards are especially burdensome for startups and are
likely to have the highest impact on entrepreneurial innovation.15 This is
because the cost of compliance with complex standards exhibits strong
economies of scale. 16 This economic effect gives large incumbents
a significant advantage over small startups.
Simple standards are not much better for most small businesses, insofar
as the regulator’s discretion and the resulting uncertainty make it difficult
to develop off-the-rack solutions to regulatory problems.17 Some startups,
however, sometimes engage in what Jordan Barry and Elizabeth Pollman
term “regulatory entrepreneurship,” where startups enter a legal gray area
with the specific intent of clarifying or changing the law in a way that
favors their business model.18 But this technique only works for startups
that are highly scalable, closely connected to customers, and have mass
appeal.19
Simple rules, unlike simple standards, can often be made to be equally
burdensome for startups and incumbents. Simple rules are, by definition,
easy to understand and comply with. There is no great advantage to having
much experience in dealing with regulation by simple rules. Access to
regulators, for example, is of little use where rules are straightforward enough
to be equally enforced. Richard A. Epstein also noted that simplifying rules
decreases error costs of getting the rule wrong, and that simple rules tend
to be the most efficient.20
Complex rules, on the other hand, demand some expensive analysis, at
least the first time they are encountered.21 Over time, complex rules can
15. See, e.g., supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S.
CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (2017).
18. Id. (“[S]ome companies pursue a line of business that has a legal issue at its
core—a significant uncertainty regarding how the law will apply to a main part of the
business operations, a need for new regulations in order for products to be feasible or
profitable, or a legal restriction that prevents the long-term operation of the business. For
these entrepreneurs, political activity is generally a major component of their business
models. Essentially, these companies are in the business of trying to change or shape the
law. We term such businesses ‘regulatory entrepreneurs,’ and this class of business activity
‘regulatory entrepreneurship.’”).
19. See id. at 442–47.
20. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21–36 (1995).
In economic terms, there is a “great trade-off . . . between social incentives and administrative
costs” and legal systems should “minimize the sum of administrative (including error) costs
and the costs associated with the creation of poor incentives for individual action.” Id. at
30, 32.
21. Cf. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 874.
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be figured out.22 This advantages larger and older firms, which encounter
the same rules time and again.23 This would indeed lead to a disparate
negative impact on small and young firms—entrepreneurs.24
Complex rules would have a disparate impact on startups, except that
technology can disrupt the boundaries of a firm. Innovative regulatory
products make it easier to “rent” than “buy” compliance solutions.25 The
technological innovation of “regulatory democratizations” makes regulatory
information and compliance costs accessible for a wider range of startups
and small businesses.26 Entrepreneurial innovations of these regulatory
compliance solutions are identified in The Startup Study27 and are described
in the case studies in this Article.28
To put this another way, technology reduces the errors and administrative
costs of complex rules. As a result of regulatory democratization, complexity
of rules is less problematic where technology has made it relatively easy
to comply, even with very complex rule-type regulations.29 The case studies
show six of these innovative responses to regulatory challenges, where
technology has enabled scalable solutions to regulatory compliance problems
that make the impact of certain regulations less disparate upon startups.30
This Article is not the first to recognize that regulations have a disparate
impact upon startups, but its new finding of regulatory democratization
contributes to the conversation on how to make regulations that encourage
entrepreneurial innovation. In particular, regulatory democratization sheds
new light on three proposed policy changes.
A current hot topic in the regulatory literature is to create “regulatory
sandboxes.”31 These sandboxes should be called regulatory sand traps because
they are going to mire startups in the shifting sands of vague standards and
22. See id.
23. See id. at 872–74.
24. Cf. Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tekenized Offering Under U.S. Law,
46 PEPP. L. REV. 405, 410 (2019) (noting the disparate impact of aggressive regulation on
startups in the cryptotransaction sphere).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Section IV.B.3.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See The Role of Regulatory Sandboxes in Fintech Innovation, FINEXTRA, (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/15759/the-role-of-regulatory-sandboxesin-fintech-innovation [https://perma.cc/Q28F-Y2SQ]; infra Section V.A. See generally Hillary
J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579 (2019).
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vast regulatory discretion. Admission to regulatory sandboxes is entirely
up to the regulator’s discretion,32 and this advantages companies that have
relationships with regulators.33 That tends to be old and large companies.34
Moreover, since the sandboxes have no rules of which to speak, it is
impossible to create any type of technological approach to this particular
regulatory apparatus.35
Another proposal is to mandate information sharing between competitors’
regulated networks.36 In addition to the obvious antitrust issues presented
by requiring competitors to share competitively sensitive information, this
proposal is sure to backfire. Moreover, practical questions remain unresolved.
How would such an information sharing network be enforced? What would
be the cost of incentivizing competitors to share appropriate information?
Who even knows what is the right information to share? This game is not
worth the candle.
Tax incentives, however, for startups might be worth exploring further.
Tax rules and potential tax savings through them can be made available to
small businesses and even individual proprietors. Thanks to technological
solutions to tax problems, information about potential tax savings can be
shared and even incorporated into business planning fairly easily. Tax
breaks for startups in their early years and for small businesses throughout
their lifetimes could offset the disparate impact of regulatory costs and
encourage entrepreneurial innovation.
In conclusion, this Article finds that regulations can and should be designed
to encourage entrepreneurial innovation, by focusing on making regulatory
compliance equal in cost for firms large and small, young and old. On the
horizon are new tools for measuring the impact of regulation. This Article
theorizes that rules and standards will have a very different impact on
regulation, and this variable should be considered in regulatory empirical
analysis.
II. THE STARTUP STUDY
The discovery of regulatory democratization arose through The Startup
Study. The author of this article spent two years conducting this fieldwork
study that was designed to generate and develop theories about the impact
of law and regulation on entrepreneurship and innovation. While most
scholars seem to agree that the laws are not optimal for entrepreneurship,37
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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there is almost nothing published on the impact of regulation on startup
innovation. The Startup Study was designed to categorically address this issue
at its largest scale.
Setting aside conclusory and somewhat political claims either that
regulations harm innovation and should be limited to ex post enforcement,38
or that the free market is dangerous to society at large and should be
controlled by the federal government,39 there are very few law review
articles discussing the impact of regulations on innovation generally40 or

38. See, e.g., Arch G. Woodside, Man-Ling Chang & Cheng-Feng Cheng, Government
Regulations of Business, Corruption, Reforms, and the Economic Growth of Nations, 11
INT’L J. BUS. & ECON. 127, 128 (2012) (“The claim appears frequently in the United States
that government regulations stifle business growth.”); see also, e.g., STEVE FORBES &
E LIZABETH A MES , H OW CAPITALISM W ILL S AVE U S : WHY F REE P EOPLE AND F REE
MARKETS ARE THE BEST ANSWER IN TODAY’S ECONOMY xi (2009) (“Government is good
at maintaining order. But it lacks the imagination and creativity to produce the kind of
innovations that have always created jobs and driven genuine growth.”); Marc Bourreau
& Pinar Doğan, Regulation and Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry, 25 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 167, 168 (2001) (“Generally, regulation can affect these innovative activities via
two different channels. Firstly, price regulations (or more specifically, the regulation of
interconnection charges and retail prices) alter industry profits, hence the incentives to
innovate. Secondly, both price and entry regulations change the terms of entry, and hence
innovation decisions regarding new entry.”); Stephan J. Goetz, Richard C. Ready & Brad
Stone, U.S. Economic Growth vs. Environmental Conditions, 27 GROWTH & CHANGE 97,
97 (1996) (“Economists generally agree that environmental regulations reduce economic
growth. Standard analysis reveals a shift in the supply curve to the left as firms comply with
regulations, leading to reduced output at higher prices[.]”).
39. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles
of Regulation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION
13, 13, 15–16 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009) (“The notion that markets, by
themselves, lead to efficient outcomes has, in short, no theoretical justification . . . .”).
40. Much of the legal scholarship on regulation and innovation deals with specific
regulations. Indeed, a substantial portion of it pertains to antitrust or patent law. For
example, excellent papers have been written on the impact of mandatory unbundling of
telecommunications networks on innovation in incumbent local exchange carriers, see,
e.g., Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation, Investment, and
Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000), or the impact of government power to enjoin
mergers on innovation in business models, see, e.g., Rachel S. Tennis & Alexander Baier
Schwab, Business Model Innovation and Antitrust Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 307, 308–10,
348–50 (2012) (recommending policy reform for mergers between firms with innovative
business models). It is unsurprising that discussions about entrepreneurship should come
up in the literature on competition law and policy, whose design is to foster innovation.
Likewise, the impact on innovation comes up in the patent context in large part because
patent law is supposed to incentivize innovation by granting a temporary monopoly to the
innovator. See Talya Ponchek, The Emergence of the Innovative Entity: Is the Patent System
Left Behind?, 16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 66, 71, 84, 112 (2016). However,
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scientifically.41
For these reasons, the Author, and co-investigators Liya Palagashvili42
and Richard A. Epstein,43 proposed a research project called The Startup
Study: The Impact of Regulation on Innovation. The researchers received
a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to interview founders,
funders, and other startup market participants about their experiences with
regulations; create qualitative datasets about our findings from these
interviews; publish scholarship based on the analysis of our findings;
develop and issue a quantitative survey based on our qualitative findings;
and analyze and publish articles on both the qualitative findings and the
quantitative results from the survey. The Startup Study thus seeks to fill
voids in the law and entrepreneurship literature through its combination
of theoretical and qualitative approaches. This Article reflects the primary
legal findings from the qualitative phase of The Startup Study.

regulations beyond those intended to directly affect incentives to innovate often have an
indirect impact on entrepreneurial innovation.
41. The entrepreneurship literature is still developing with regard to the impact of
regulation on startup innovation. In this literature, the impact of regulation on entrepreneurship
is often accounted for only indirectly by its composition within more general or only
partially overlapping factors such as industry uncertainty. While it is generally acknowledged
that government, law, and regulation impact a startup’s entry—the impact of regulation on
entrepreneurship—much of the scholarly attention in the entrepreneurship literature has
instead focused on intrinsic factors such as the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs
—risk preferences—or non-regulatory industry factors such as industry advertising intensity,
industry density, and industry profitability. See Stephanie A. Fernhaber, Patricia P. McDougall
& Benjamin M. Oviatt, Exploring the Role of Industry Structure in New Venture
Internationalization, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 517 (2007) (providing a
comprehensive literature review that defined nearly twenty industry structure variables—
none of which pertain to industry regulation); see, e.g., Thomas J. Dean & G. Dale Meyer,
Industry Environments and New Venture Formations in U.S. Manufacturing: A Conceptual and
Empirical Analysis of Demand Determinants, 11 J. BUS. VENTURING 107 (1996) (industry
structure’s impact on new venture formation); Patricia P. McDougall, Richard B. Robinson, Jr.
& Angelo S. DeNisi, Modeling New Venture Performance: An Analysis of New Venture
Strategy, Industry Structure, and Venture Origin, 7 J. BUS. VENTURING 267 (1992) (industry
structure’s impact on new venture performance); Patricia Phillips McDougal et al., The
Effects of Industry Growth and Strategic Breadth on New Venture Performance and Strategy
Content, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 537 (1994) (industry structure’s impact on new venture
strategic behavior); William R. Sandberg & Charles W. Hofer, Improving New Venture
Performance: The Role of Strategy, Industry Structure, and the Entrepreneur, 2 J. OF BUS.
VENTURING 5, 5–28 (1987) (industry structure’s impact on new venture performance).
42. Liya Palagashvili, Assistant Professor of Economics, State University of New
York-Purchase; Research Fellow and Program Affiliate Scholar, The Classical Liberal Institute
at New York University.
43. Richard A. Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law and Director of the
Classical Liberal Institute at New York University, James Parker Hall Professor of Law
Emeritus and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago, and Peter and Kirsten Bedford
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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The Startup Study began with a qualitative phase in which the main goal
was theory development. To achieve this research goal, the researchers
selected unstructured interviews as a research tool. The use of unstructured
interviews for the purpose of theory development is well-established in
the anthropology and sociology literatures.44 Fieldwork appears to be
much less common in the legal literature; however, there are precedents
for the use of unstructured interviews for qualitative analysis in legal
scholarship as well.45
The unstructured interview technique is a well-established means of
understanding the complex behavior of people without imposing any a
priori categorization.46 This approach allowed The Startup Study to begin
with a broad scope of inquiry designed to maximize potential for theory
development. Fieldwork researchers followed best practices to promote
consistency across the interview sessions, including the establishment of
aide memoire by setting an agenda of topics that might be covered in the
interviews.47
From May 2017 to December 2017, fieldworkers Dr. Liya Palagashvili
and Seth C. Oranburg traveled across the United States48 and interviewed
44. See, e.g., Yan Zhang & Barbara M. Wildemuth, Unstructured Interviews, in
APPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS TO QUESTIONS IN INFORMATION AND
LIBRARY SCIENCE 222, 223–24 (Barbara M. Wildemuth ed., 2009) (“Unstructured interviews
can be very useful in studies of people’s information seeking and use. They are especially
useful for studies attempting to find patterns, generate models, and inform information system
design and implementation.” “[T]he purpose of inquiry is theory development rather than
theory testing.”).
45. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 115 (1979) (conducting qualitative research through unstructured interviews
of approximately 100 lawyers from across five Wisconsin counties to learn about the
impact of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on the practice of law, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–
2312 (2018)); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993) (conducting qualitative research through unstructured interviews
of consumer debt lawyers, chapter 13 trustees, and other participants in the bankruptcy
system).
46. KEITH F. PUNCH, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL RESEARCH: QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE APPROACHES 185–86 (1998).
47. See generally ROBERT G. BURGESS, IN THE FIELD: AN INTRODUCTION TO FIELD
RESEARCH 108 (Martin Bulmer ed., 1984); Charles Briggs, Interview, 9 J. LINGUISTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 137, 137–38 (2000); Terence McCann & Eileen Clark, Using Unstructured
Interviews with Participants Who Have Schizophrenia, 13 NURSE RESEARCHER 7, 11–13
(2005).
48. To provide a national scope for The Startup Study, interviews were conducted
in Austin, Texas; Boston, Massachusetts; the Denver-Boulder Metro Area, Colorado; Los
Angeles, California; the Miami Metro Area, Florida; New York City, New York; Omaha,

765

ORANBURG_57-3_PRE_ORANBURG_PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

10/16/2020 11:51 AM

eighty-eight participants in the domestic startup ecosystem. Of these, fortyfive were with startups, twelve were with investors, and twenty-one were
with other startup market participants. In addition, these researches also
traveled internationally and interviewed startups in Israel and London.49
Subjects were chosen via four methods: geographical sampling,50
judgment sampling,51 opportunity sampling,52 and snowball sampling.53
Researchers contacted these subjects via phone, email, LinkedIn, Twitter,
Facebook, and other social media platforms and requested a one-hour inperson interview. Most interviews were indeed conducted on-site and inperson, although a few were conducted by conference call or teleconference
platforms, such as Zoom or Skype.
Nebraska; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; the San Diego Metro Area, California; and the Silicon
Valley-San Francisco Metro Area, California.
49. International interviews included: eleven in Tel Aviv; eight in Jerusalem; two
in other regions of Israel; and eleven in London, UK.
50. Researchers created a list of startup hub cities based on multiple lists of top cities for
startups published by institutions such as the Kauffman Foundation for Entrepreneurship
and trade publications such as Inc. Magazine, Entrepreneur, etc. See ROBERT FAIRLIE, ARNOBIO
MORELIX & INARA TAREQUE, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., 2017 KAUFMAN INDEX
OF STARTUP ACTIVITY: METROPOLITAN AREA AND CITY TRENDS 9–13 (2017), https://www.
kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2017_Kauffman_Index_Startup_Activity_Metro_
Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6U4-H8VN]; Emily Canal, The 10 Hottest Startup
Cities in America, INC (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.inc.com/emily-canal/top-10-citiessuccessful-businesses-2019-inc5000.html [https://perma.cc/7EEP-3GRY]; Angela Ruth,
The Top 7 Cities Competing with Silicon Valley for Tech Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/299173 [https://perma.cc/F4XJ727X]. Researchers then used CrunchBase Pro—a proprietary database of startups that
contains details including the names and emails of founders and executives—to search for
startups in those cities that met the chosen criteria. See generally CRUNCHBASE, https://
www.crunchbase.com [https://perma.cc/7VX6-D46H]. Criteria included: privately held,
technology startups, less than seven years old, that had received outside funding but had not
passed the Series C stage. From this list, researchers and their staff cold called, emailed,
and sent LinkedIn messages to these executives and founders. They then described The
Startup Study and requested a live interview on specific dates when the fieldworkers would
be in that city. If these initial efforts did not generate a response, the researchers leveraged
personal connections and networking to secure interviews.
51. Researchers sought out specific firms in targeted cities that were well-known
for being influential in the startup marketplace. Judgement sampling led researchers to seek
out interviews with venture capital firms, accelerators, and incubators that are known to
be key players in local and national startup ecosystems.
52. Researchers spent a considerable amount of time in each city, where they attended
startup events related to The Startup Study. At some of these events, the researchers
met founders and executives of startups who were not initially identified through the geographic
sampling, but who expressed knowledge about the impact of regulation on startups. Researchers
took these fortunate meetings as opportunities to conduct additional interviews.
53. After some interviews, interviewees offered to connect the researchers with other
potential interviewees. Prior to accepting this invitation, researchers determined whether
these proposed connections would make a valuable contribution to The Startup Study. If
so, researchers followed up with a subsequent interview based on this snowball effect.
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Almost all the interviews were recorded for further analysis, except in
a few cases where the interviewee requested that the interview not be
recorded. After each interview, a research assistant read the researcher’s
interview notes, listened to the recording,54 and drafted a memorandum
that identified the key issues, the topics addressed, and details that were
discussed. The research assistant also provided some suggestions for further
investigation. The researchers than reviewed each of the memoranda and
compiled them into five distinct datasets: GenTech,55 FinTech,56 MedTech,57
Israel, and London.
To encourage the interviewees to speak frankly about their experiences,
the researchers agreed to maintain their confidentiality. Accordingly, the
people interviewed are not identified in this Article. However, a common
54. In the very few cases where a recording was not available, notes taken during
the interview were later expanded and refined by the interviewer.
55. GenTech—as used in this article—refers to general technology firms, which
includes most technology startups—software, IT, database, B2B, media, social networks,
artificial intelligence, etc. A key criterion for GenTech is the absence of any highly specific or
especially onerous regulations. GenTech startups and small businesses are still subject to
general regulations such as employment, immigration, patent, tax, etc. See Daniel McKenzie,
Startup Law A to Z: Regulatory Compliance, EXTRA CRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2019, 12:17 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/04/startup-law-a-to-z-regulatory-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/
A86J-PW5X].
56. FinTech references financial technology firms, which include blockchain,
crowdfunding, cryptocurrency, insurance, microfinance, payment systems, and robotrading companies. See Julia Kagain, Financial Technology – Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/D5RA-4SL5].
FinTech firms generally have to deal with additional regulations from the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and state
financial regulators. See id.
57. MedTech refers to firms that require FDA approval prior to selling products in
the U.S. market. See Scott Gottlieb, Advancing Policies to Promote Safe, Effective MedTech
Innovation, FDA (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/advancingpolicies-promote-safe-effective-medtech-innovation [https://perma.cc/FL7S-FN7T]; Kevin
O’Keeffe, The Rise of Medtech, MDDI (June 10, 2011), https://www.mddionline.com/
rise-medtech [https://perma.cc/HDP9-M33F]. This includes Class II medical devices and
Class III pharmaceuticals. See O’Keeffe, supra; Classify Your Medical Device, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/classify-your-medicaldevice [https://perma.cc/3BFP-5ZWP]. It does not include “digital health” companies like
Fitbit who make devices that relate to health but do not claim to treat any particular disease
or medical condition. See FDA Says It Won’t Regulate FitBit, Many Other Fitness Wearables,
ADVISORY BOARD (Aug. 18, 2016, 8:17 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/
2016/08/18/fda-says-it-wont-regulate-fitbit [https://perma.cc/A7EQ-KTAX]. See generally
CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL
WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/90652/
download [https://perma.cc/V8MS-55JW].
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thread that wove throughout their stories was their use of technology to
comply with certain regulations. But for that technology, competition in
that regulated industry would be impossible. This Article will now focus
on that technology, which it terms “regulatory democratizations.”
III. REGULATORY DEMOCRATIZATIONS
Discovering the phenomenon of regulatory democratizations was a primary
finding of The Startup Study. This Section will first define and discuss
regulatory democratization (RD) in general. Then it will present case studies
of companies engaging in RD as specific illustrations of the general concept.
RDs are technological solutions for regulatory compliance problems.
RD only arises in regulated industries where technology is able to make
regulatory compliance cheaper for a large number of firms. In other words,
companies will develop RD products when they can sell scalable compliance
solutions, and companies will purchase RD technologies when they can
make regulatory compliance more affordable.
RD seems to depend on new technologies that have only recently become
available. The startups described below are powered by virtual servers,
artificial intelligence, and other cutting-edge technologies. In particular,
the general availability of cloud computing power seems essential for RD.
The common thread binding these necessary technologies together is that
they all make it easier to enter new markets and scale up production. For
example, cloud computing makes it easy to “rent” instead of “buy” processing
power.58
RD companies use this processing power to further make it cheaper for
small firms to “rent” compliance solutions, instead of “buying” complex
and customized solutions for each firm. Lowering the “rental” cost of
regulatory compliance makes compliance affordable for more young and
small companies. RD thus mitigates some of the disparate impact of regulatory
burdens faced by entrepreneurs. In this way, RD can have a dramatic effect
on regulated markets by facilitating entry and competition—so long as
underlying regulations are computable.
RD is distinct from traditional regulatory consulting services. In the
traditional model, a consulting firm provides customized professional advice
to a single individual or an organization for a fee.59 Consultancy may include
58. See Steve Ranger, What is Cloud Computing? Everything You Need to Know
About the Cloud, Explained, ZDNET (Dec. 13, 2018, 12:24 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
what-is-cloud-computing-everything-you-need-to-know-from-public-and-private-cloudto-software-as-a/ [https://perma.cc/B5LQ-6TH8].
59. See, e.g., ACCESTRA, https://www.accestra.com [https://perma.cc/6WYH-FML3];
Regulatory Affairs, BEAUFORT, https://www.beaufortcro.com/regulatory-affairs [https://perma.cc/
Y7EC-Y9KT].
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advice on strategy, operations, management, taxation, human resources, etc.60
Traditional regulatory consulting is the analogue to the digital solution of RD.
A regulatory consulting firm provides customized advice as to how an
individual or firm can navigate a given regulation. Further, these consulting
firms have a distinct comparative advantage61 in assessing, analyzing, and
digesting regulatory information. Due to the principle of microeconomic
specialization,62 they are better suited to distill this information and tailor
legal strategies for other firms, rather than a firm trying to navigate the
applicable regulation regime in-house.
For example, NAMSA is a medical research organization that helps
firms comply with FDA regulations.63 An organization can hire NAMSA
to provide a risk assessment of whether a new medical device is likely to
be considered a biological risk under, for example, ISO 10993-1 or the
EU Medical Device Directive.64 For these services, a firm like NAMSA
might charge up to $1,000 per hour.65

60. See Jennifer Wilson, Consulting Services Can Grow Your Firm—if Managed
Properly, J. ACCT. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/newsletters/2016/
mar/consulting-services-can-grow-firm.html [https://perma.cc/XWF2-89C3].
61. David Ricardo expanded on Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage. See
DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION 66, 388–402
(3d ed. 1821). Ricardo argued that even if a country has an absolute advantage in producing
both goods, the other may have a comparative advantage and should produce the good
associated with the lower opportunity cost to increase economic welfare. Id.
62. Firms that are better suited to analyze regulation regimes have an endogenous
comparative advantage because of internal factors such as training, resources, and
investments in equipment. These firms can sell their services to other firms, which results
in an efficient division of labor and microeconomic specialization. Sherwin Rosen,
Substitution and Division of Labour, 45 ECONOMICA 235, 235 (1978) (“[T]he packaging
of work activities into bundles is itself the endogenous outcome of economic decisions.”).
63. See Our History: From CRO to MRO, NAMSA, https://www.namsa.com/ourhistory [https://perma.cc/B9WF-B8WQ].
64. See Medical Device Regulatory Consulting, NAMSA, https://www.namsa.com/
services/consulting/regulatory [https://perma.cc/XC4Q-V2K7]; Biological Safety Services,
NAMSA, https://www.namsa.com/services/testing/biological-safety-services [https://perma.cc/
WXJ6-8TQJ]; EU MDR & IVDR Planning Resources, NAMSA, https://www.namsa.com/
mdr-ivdr-resources [https://perma.cc/79YZ-N4WX].
65. Hanh Nguyen, How Much Should You Pay for a Compliance Consultant?,
LINKEDIN (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-much-should-you-paycompliance-consultant-hanh-nguyen/ [https://perma.cc/5GJM-SRWK].
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Due to such high fees, many startups and small businesses, especially
ones that “run lean,”66 cannot afford to hire traditional regulatory consultants.
With the option of compliance off the table, startups and small businesses
are left with two options: proceed with the development of a product that
might not comply with regulations or abandon the project completely.
Accordingly, some startups begin their life in willful ignorance or even
deliberate violation of regulatory requirements, while other small businesses
are stillborn in regulatory limbo.
RD solves the dilemma of unaffordable noncompliance by offering a
way for startups and small businesses to comply with regulations affordably.
Unlike a traditional consulting firm, which offers customized expertise to
individual organizations at a relatively high price,67 an RD firm offers a
technological solution that can be employed by a large number of startups
for a relatively low price. To accomplish this, RD firms’ business models
rely on economies of scale.68
RD is thus distinct from the traditional regulatory consultancy. Traditionally,
a consulting firm prepares a customized regulatory solution for a unique
client at a high cost.69 A customized solution may include expensive longterm political investments, such as lobbying and hobnobbing with regulators.70
Accordingly, only large and longstanding firms could afford regulatory
consultancy. Now, under RD, technologies offer scalable solutions to regulatory
problems for a large number of firms. Unlike traditional consulting firms,
which are generally too expensive for small firms to employ, RD firms offer
scalable regulatory compliance solutions that are affordable and sometimes
even free for the smallest firms. Thus, RD makes it easier for small and
young firms to compete with large and old ones.
Technological solutions that work for a wide range of startups and small
businesses are not easy to create. If they were, then traditional consulting
66. For a discussion on the lean startup model, see Steve Blank, Why the Lean StartUp Changes Everything, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/05/why-thelean-start-up-changes-everything [https://perma.cc/VL2E-V2YY].
67. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
68. The concept of economies of scale dates back as far as Adam Smith, who
explained how the division of labor can result in lower costs of production. See Reem
Heakal, What Are Economies of Scale? INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.investo
pedia.com/insights/what-are-economies-of-scale [https://perma.cc/22NN-HY3E]. A simple
example of economies of scale in ordinary life is the lower costs a consumer incurs when
buying in bulk. Id. In general, as a good or service becomes more standardized, or
“commoditized,” that commodity becomes less expensive. See id.
69. See Soren Kaplan, The Business Consulting Industry Is Booming, and It’s About
to Be Disrupted, INC. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.inc.com/soren-kaplan/the-businessconsulting-industry-is-booming-and-it.html [https://perma.cc/C4AE-H5R7].
70. See, e.g., Public Policy & Regulation, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, https://www.hklaw.
com/en/services/practices/regulatory-and-government-affairs/public-policy-regulation
[https://perma.cc/7FG7-FLT7].
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firms would be obsolete. Yet the traditional consulting industry is clearly
necessary, as evidenced by the fact that it generates about $506 billion in
annual revenues.71 However, technology, especially cloud computing and
artificial intelligence (AI), is making technological RD solutions more
feasible.
RD not only changes how much regulatory costs are incurred by small
business. RD also changes when those costs are incurred. By transforming
up-front costs to pay-as-you-go costs, RD makes it much easier to run a
cash-strapped small business in a highly regulated environment.
Traditional regulatory costs—such as paying a consultant to determine
whether a proposed product would be in compliance with a given regulation
—are incurred up front.72 Costs for FDA pharmaceutical trials, for example,
are incurred before the first pill is sold.73 To afford the massive up-front
costs, many pharmaceutical companies try to raise billions of dollars via
an initial public offering in order to finance drug trials.74
Startups and small businesses that lack access to capital markets find it
very difficult to pay such huge up-front costs.75 Entrepreneurs may decide
not to enter a market where the initial price of admission is too high.
71. Consulting Industry Market Research, PLUNKETT RES., https://www.plunkett
research.com/industries/consulting-market-research [https://perma.cc/32EE-GJHF].
72. See Consulting Fees and Rates: How Much Should I Charge?, CONSULTING,
https://www.consulting.com/consulting-fees-rates [https://perma.cc/9S3A-N3LW].
73. See Matthew Herper, The Cost of Developing Drugs is Insane. That Paper That
Says Otherwise is Insanely Bad, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/matthewherper/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-a-paper-thatargued-otherwise-was-insanely-bad/#23cecea82d45 [https://perma.cc/W2RN-QYAT].
74. See generally DAVID THOMAS & CHAD WESSEL, BIO, 2019 EMERGING THERAPEUTIC
COMPANY TREND REPORT (2019), http://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-999/images/BIO%202019%20
Emerging%20Company%20Trend%20Report.pdf[https://perma.cc/9679-TPGM]. It
is well-known in the industry that pharmaceutical companies
are highly dependent on access to capital. For early-stage private companies,
the majority of this investment comes in the form of venture capital until the eventual
listing on a public exchange. This initial public offering is the first of what can
be many rounds of financing from public investors through follow-on public offerings,
financings that can provide timely access to capital after key clinical or regulatory
milestones.
Id. at 4.
75. See Michael R. Wade & Jialu Shan, The Battle for Digital Disruption: Startups
v. Incumbents, IMD (Mar. 2016), https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/thebattle-for-digital-disruption-startups-vs-incumbents [https://perma.cc/ZX5W-KNZ6]. There
are at least two reasons why fixed costs have a disparate impact on startups versus incumbents.
See id. First, the startup generally needs to pay that cost with debt or equity, whereas an
incumbent also has the option of paying via cash flows. See id. Second, startups have more
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Yet, RD provides an alternative to raising capital to “buy” compliance
at a high up-front cost. RD can transform a high initial cost into a lower
but ongoing cost. In other words, RD transforms up-front, fixed regulatory
costs into ongoing, variable regulatory costs. Such technologies can make
it possible for smaller and younger companies to compete with larger and
older ones. To put this in terms of economics, RD technology flattens the
average cost curve of regulatory compliance. This makes a more level
playing field for competition between large and small firms in highly
regulated markets.

Cast

Quantity

Quantity

Figure 1. Regulatory democratization “flattens” the average cost curve of regulatory
compliance. Without regulatory democratization, this curve has economies of
scale that advantage larger firms, who spread the cost of compliance over a greater
quantity of goods or services sold, over smaller firms.

RD is not entirely new. After all, online forms have helped entrepreneurs
save legal costs for decades, and hornbooks also democratize access to the
legal process.76 One might even argue that the printing press is a technological
innovation that enabled a sort of fifteenth century RD.77
But this Article argues that the use of cloud computing and artificial
intelligence technologies has enabled RD to make a higher degree of impact
on competition in highly regulated industries.
Next, this Part will introduce five case studies of startups that offer RD
technologies—Paubox, AirMap, Avalara, Cognigo, and Metomic. In addition,
Amazon Web Services provides compliance technologies for these and
other regulations, and it forms the hardware backbone for many startups’
uncertainty as to whether they will succeed in a new market, as compared with incumbents
who have greater certainty as to whether they will continue to operate in an existing market.
The uncertainty of return on investment for startups adds to their cost. See id.
76. See Daniel W. Linna, Jr., What We Know and Need to Know About Legal Startups,
67 S.C. L. REV. 389, 394–95, 410 (2016).
77. See generally Steven Kreis, The Printing Press, HIST. GUIDE (May 2, 2016),
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/press.html [https://perma.cc/78GJ-2EL5].
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software solutions, including RD.78 The startups described below were
not necessarily interviewed by the researchers in The Startup Study.
However, these startups came to the attention of the researchers through
the process of theory development via unstructured interviews with startup
market participants.
A. Paubox
Paubox is a startup that developed an RD solution for doctors’ offices.79
Doctors’ offices must comply with many regulations, including the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).80 HIPAA regulates
the storage and transmission of protected health information (PHI).81
Essentially, HIPAA requires PHI to be sent in encrypted formats such that
doctors’ offices generally cannot email patient records without investing
tens of thousands of dollars to install and maintain their own secure email
servers.82
Paubox was founded in 2015 to offer a solution whereby doctors’ office
could send secure emails via a simple app called Paubox.83 Instead of paying
a huge upfront cost for private email servers, Paubox users pay a low monthly
rate, based on their usage.84 This makes it much cheaper for small doctors’
offices to email PHI, helping small doctors’ offices compete on the dimension
of patient communication with large healthcare systems that can more easily
afford to build their own secure PHI transmission infrastructure.

78. E.g., Hot AWS EdStart Startups: GlyphEd, Exploros, and WayUp, AMAZON WEB
SERVICES (May 1, 2018), https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/hot-aws-edstartstartups-glyphed-exploros-and-wayup/ [https://perma.cc/N5SZ-BJX5].
79. About Us, PAUBOX, https://www.paubox.com/about [https://perma.cc/G9BL-7S96].
80. See Who Must Comply with HIPAA Privacy Standards, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES (Dec. 19, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/190/whomust-comply-with-hipaa-privacy-standards/index.html [https://perma.cc/L7NH-PLH4].
81. See What is PHI? U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Feb. 26, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/answers/hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html [https://perma.cc/XT7A-KKMZ].
82. HIPAA Compliance for Email, HIPAA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa
-compliance-for-email [https://perma.cc/GW56-JAZQ]. For an inexhaustive list of HIPAA
email compliance costs, see Best HIPAA Compliant Email Encryption Services, TOTAL
HIPAA COMPLIANCE (May 1, 2019), https://www.totalhipaa.com/hipaa-compliant-emailencryption-services [https://perma.cc/PZ57-CZEL].
83. See Paubox HIPAA Compliant Email Demo, PAUBOX (May 28, 2015), https://
paubox.wistia.com/medias/d17vqybqog?wvideo=d17vqybqog [https://perma.cc/5QS8-DRFD].
84. Paubox Encrypted Email Pricing, PAUBOX, https://www.paubox.com/solutions/
encrypted-email/pricing [https://perma.cc/MK8E-PUTM].
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HIPAA is a typical example of an anachronistic regulation. When
HIPAA was passed in 1996, email was far less frequently used as compared
to today.85 Facsimile, on the other hand, was generally considered a secure
transmission method under HIPAA without taking other steps.86 As a
result, many healthcare organizations relied on fax transmission and eschewed
email for many years.87
Perhaps this reliance on fax transmission made sense in 1996, but the
means of communication have changed significantly since then. For example,
in 2000, approximately 12 billion emails were sent per day.88 In 2018,
approximately 281 billion emails were sent per day,89 and estimates suggest
that daily email traffic will increase to 306 billion per day in 2020 and to
347 billion per day in 2023.90 Meanwhile, many observers recognize that
HIPAA is the reason why the healthcare industry continues to rely on
archaic fax technology.91

85. See Jim Grubbs, E-mail and Instant Messaging, in 1 THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
660, 661 (Hossein Bidgoli ed., 2004), http://www.encyclopedias.biz/dw/The%20Internet
%20Encyclopedia,%20Volume%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TGC-SA9L]. In 1996, when
HIPAA was passed into law, an average of about 300 million emails were sent every day.
Id. at 661.
86. See Shifali Arora, Jennifer Yttri & Wendy Nilsen, Privacy and Security in Mobile
Health (mHealth) Research, 36 ALCOHOL RES. 143, 144 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4432854/pdf/arcr-36-1-143.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY8X-ERRJ] (“At the
time these rules were introduced, clinical health information existed primarily in the form
of handwritten patient health records. Information generally was shared between care
providers over the phone, by fax or in person. Consequently, initial regulations and guidelines
focused on the challenges surrounding protecting information in these limited-sharing
formats.”).
87. Yvonne Li, The Slow Disappearance of the Fax Machine in Healthcare, HEALTH
IT EXCHANGE (Dec. 3, 2014, 1:31 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20180317190600/
https://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/healthitexchange/CommunityBlog/the-slowdisappearance-of-the-fax-machine-in-healthcare [https://perma.cc/43WE-ZZ8B] (“Fax,
short for facsimile, involves the transmission of scanned printed material over phone lines,
typically to a telephone number connected to a printer or other device. Although fax reliance
peaked in the 1980s, which is also when it took off in healthcare offices, its invention dates
all the way back to 1843.”).
88. Oliver J. Chiang, The Decade in Data, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2009, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/27/broadband-text-messages-technology-cio-networkdata.html#4324c86b5fc3 [https://perma.cc/5AC6-R7TP].
89. THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2018-2022 EXECUTIVE
S UMMARY 3 (2018), https://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Email_
Statistics_Report,_2018-2022_Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/V87M-EPXP].
90. Id.; Jessica Clement, Number of E-mail Users Worldwide 2017-2024, STATISTA
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/255080/number-of-e-mail-users-worldwide
[https://perma.cc/AHK8-UF2V].
91. Sophie Haigney, The Fax Is Not Yet Obsolete, ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/why-people-still-use-fax-machines/
576070 [https://perma.cc/L2VA-VG93].
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Part of the reason why healthcare was stuck in the technological stone
age was the sheer cost of implementing modern communications solutions
that are HIPAA compliant. HIPAA compliance costs create significant
overhead, including cyber liability insurance,92 technical errors and omissions
insurance,93 HIPAA training for new employees and ongoing HIPAA training,94
HIPAA audits,95 encryption for laptops and other data-related processes,96
and other costs.
These costs can be insurmountable for small doctors’ offices, which is
precisely why Paubox’s solution is designed for and adopted by these small
businesses. These small doctors’ offices appreciate that Paubox’s encrypted
email is a plug-and-play solution.97 Small businesses may not have the technical
staff or computing infrastructure for complex adoption, but Paubox makes
it easy for small doctors’ offices to send PHI via email while complying
with HIPAA. 98 In a world where the fax machine is a dying breed of
communication device, Paubox helps small doctors’ offices be more
competitive with large firms.
Interestingly, Paubox relies on AWS99 to provide its HIPAA-compliant
email service.100 AWS is Payment Card Industry (PCI), Sarbanes-Oxley

92. Cyber Liability: Complying with HIPAA Regulations, JAMISON (Dec. 31, 2015,
4:03 PM), https://www.jamisongroup.com/blog/cyber-liability-complying-with-hipaaregulations.aspx [https://perma.cc/H8YS-WXCG].
93. Have Clients in Healthcare? Understand the Professional Liability Exposures,
INSUREON (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.insureon.com/blog/have-clients-in-healthcareunderstand-the-professional-liability-exposures [https://perma.cc/K349-WG7T].
94. HIPAA Training Requirements, HIPAA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaatraining-requirements [https://perma.cc/8FQA-E9CS].
95. See Perry Price, The Cost of a HIPAA Audit, REVATION SYSTEMS (June 1, 2019),
https://revation.com/hipaa-audit-costs [https://perma.cc/Q8FF-PASV].
96. Mobile Data Security and HIPAA Compliance, HIPAA J., https://www.hipaa
journal.com/mobile-data-security-and-hipaa-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/H876-VZF3].
97. See Customer Stories, PAUBOX, https://www.paubox.com/customers [https://perma.cc/
PZY2-5CGN]; Rick Kuwahara, Paubox Named a High Performer in Three Categories in
G2 Crowd’s December 2018 Report, PAUBOX (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.paubox.com/blog/
paubox-named-a-high-performer-in-three-categories-in-g2-crowds-december-2018-report
[https://perma.cc/W4AC-HN3F].
98. See Arianna Etemadiah, How to Encrypt Your Email and Why You Should, PAUBOX
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.paubox.com/blog/how-to-encrypt-email [https://perma.cc/
6Q66-7SW2].
99. See infra Section III.F.
100. Evan Fitzgerald, Paubox Joins Amazon’s AWS Partner Network (APN), PAUBOX
(June 7, 2017), https://www.paubox.com/blog/paubox-amazon-aws-partner-network [https://
perma.cc/WEG7-6RHG].
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Act (SOX), and HIPAA compliant.101 So long as AWS/EC2 users write
code that does not break compliance, users can scale their business using
AWS cloud services.102 This is an example of how AWS makes it possible
for Schumpeterian entrepreneurs—innovators who disrupt existing industries
and thereby change market equilibria,103 like Hoala Greevy, founder and
CEO of Paubox104—and startups, like Paubox, to compete with large
incumbent firms. Paubox would not be able to offer a competitive HIPAA
compliant email solution if it had to bear the cost of buying its own web
servers.
B. AirMap
AirMap is a startup whose goal is to help make drones part of everyday
life by helping drone operators navigate the regulations for low-altitude
operation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).105 This requires navigating
a complex and dynamic web of regulations. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) creates reports that are supposed to explain how
to comply with the regulations on UAVs,106 but, through our study, we
learned that the rule-making committees do not appreciate dissent from
the consensus opinion within the industry. Generally, the committee only
listens to major players such as Boeing, which means their reports and
recommendations do not reflect the needs and use cases of the UAV
community at large.107
101.
AMAZON WEB SERVS., AMAZON WEB SERVICES: RISK AND COMPLIANCE 5 (2017),
https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/compliance/AWS_Risk_and_Compliance_Whitepa
per.pdf [perma.cc/7RKP-X7JQ].
102. See Amazon EC2 FAQs, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/
ec2/faqs [https://perma.cc/X9AC-5VZY]. “EC2” refers to Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud,
a “web service that provides secure, resizable compute capacity in the cloud.” Id.
103. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 71–75
(Routledge 2010) (1943). Joseph Schumpeter introduced the concept of entrepreneurship
in conjunction with the idea of creative destruction in a chapter titled “The Process of Creative
Destruction” in his seminal monograph. See id.
104. About Us, supra note 79.
105. Lora Kolodny, AirMap Raises $26 Million to Manage Air Traffic as Drone Use
Surges, T ECH C RUNCH (Feb. 23, 2017, 4:33 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/23/
airmap-raises-26-million-to-manage-air-traffic-as-drone-use-surges/ [https://perma.cc/
7FY8-484Y].
106.
See, e.g., MICRO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYS. AVIATION RULEMAKING COMM.,
ARC RECOMMENDATIONS FINAL REPORT (2016), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_
records/media/Micro-UAS-ARC-FINAL-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KSE-F2NT]
(recommending a regulatory framework for the FAA in the classification and operation of
UAVs).
107. See Natalie Kitroeff & David Gelles, Before Deadly Crashes Boeing Pushed
for Law that Undercut Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/27/business/boeing-737-max-crashes.html [https://perma.cc/KW7Q-7M4V]; Brian
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Since access to the FAA rulemaking process is dominated by a few
large incumbent players who do not want the rules to change and do not
want innovative startup competitors to be able to try new business models,
disruption of the aviation industry by small startups seemed impossible.
AirMap, however, provides these small startups with a platform that it terms
“collaborate acceleration,” whereby startups may collectively engage in
educating a regulatory agency and encourage them to try a more innovative
approach.108 AirMap thus engages in a unique sort of regulatory democratization
by making it easier for small startups to influence agency decision-making.
AirMap also builds software that reflects the more common sort of
regulatory democratization. Their Discover function allows users to view
airspace advisories, airspace requirements, and even weather conditions
before flight.109 “The AirMap Platform includes a Tile Map Service that allows
developers to visually display airspace and advisories to pilots as an overlay.”110
They also have a function that allows users to go mobile with airspace mapping
via iOS or Android.111 According to our interviews, it would be prohibitively
expensive for individual drone operators to obtain this information. AirMap
lowers the relative cost of compliance for small startups by showing all
pilot advisories and displays of the airspace,112 whereas the large fixed
costs in developing this custom software is astronomical and impossible
for small firms to afford.
“AirMap’s Airspace Advisory API takes in a geometry (i.e. flight area)
and a ruleset identifier, returning all the relevant advisories that intersect

Naylor, Boeing’s Not Alone in Companies that Government Agencies Have Let SelfRegulate, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019 5:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709203191/
boeings-not-alone-in-companies-that-government-agencies-have-let-self-regulate [https://
perma.cc/4CSF-7G2Q].
108. See, e.g., Gary Mortimer, FlytBase and AirMap Agree to Collaborate on
Accelerating UTM Support for Drone Automation, SUAS NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://
www.suasnews.com/2019/05/flytbase-and-airmap-agree-to-collaborate-on-acceleratingutm-support-for-drone-automation/ [https://perma.cc/F42J-9HWC].
109. Developers, AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com/developers [https://perma.cc/
TH4E-X8RL]; Discover, Connect, and Now Fly Your DJI Drone with AirMap, AIRMAP,
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.airmap.com/airmap-for-drones-app-fly-dji/ [https://perma.cc/
AY6X-5K4U].
110. Overview, AIRMAP, https://developers.airmap.com/docs/maps-overview [https://
perma.cc/MRJ7-VR8K].
111. Id.
112. Developers, supra note 109.
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with that flight area.”113 Regulatory issues with certain airspaces such as
the type of aircraft allowed in a specific zone, height restrictions, etc., can
be monitored, facilitating a safer and regulatory compliant flight path.114
Without AirMap, mapping a safe and compliant flight path could be
prohibitively expensive. 115 Hiring someone who knows the rules and
regulations for aircraft and differentiating between different flight zones
would be expensive—the software clearly offsets that cost and makes
frequent UAV flights possible for a wider range of operators.116
AirMap provides additional tools that UAV operators would otherwise
have to develop and implement themselves, at a high initial fixed cost.
For example, AirMap connects with DroneLogbook to provide a simple
and convenient tool for professional and private drone pilots around the
world to log and save drone activities data such as flights, drones used, and
places traveled, in addition to equipment and maintenance data.117
AirMap’s Traffic Alert API allows developers to provide their pilots with alerts
about nearby traffic—including commercial airplanes, general aviation airplanes,
helicopters, and some unmanned aircraft. The traffic feed is a combination of
several highly reliable sources used by the airline industry. The Traffic Alert API
automatically filters to alert the operator of only traffic that is low-altitude and
near the current flight path.118

The AirMap UTM Dashboard makes it easy for airspace managers to
provide drone operators with safe and secure access to the airspace in three
additional ways: (1) identification—knowing who is flying within managed
airspace, with contact details and identity verification capabilities; (2) geofencing
—creating digital boundaries with rules-based access requirements, instantly
publishing geofences to thousands of drone operators; and (3) communication
—talking directly with drone operators via individual SMS text messages
or broadcast notifications to AirMap-powered applications.119 All these
products help small operations compete and even collaborate with large ones.
AirMap’s products make it easy and relatively inexpensive to comply with
regulations, even in this fast-changing industry.
113. Airspace Advisory, AIRMAP, https://developers.airmap.com/docs/airspace-advisory
[https://perma.cc/N2TF-S32R].
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See AirMap Platform, AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com/platform/#industryparticipation [https://perma.cc/C36A-UUST].
116. See id.
117. Solution Providers, AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com/solution-providers [https://
perma.cc/6X4G-USJR]; Features, DRONELOGBOOK, https://www.dronelogbook.com/hp/
1/features.html [https://perma.cc/UZ44-2M79].
118. Traffic Alerts Overview, AIRMAP, https://developers.airmap.com/docs/trafficalerts-overview [https://perma.cc/X97D-J24M].
119. See Authorities, AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com/authorities/ [https://perma.cc/
458B-EQSU].
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AirMap is thereby involved in RD. The costs involved in adhering to
FAA regulations are high. Pilots and firms involved in flying need to hire
employees who know the regulations, monitor those regulations as they
change, and then still train those employees to properly use flight planning
and airspace software. The technological cost in conjunction with employment
costs are high; AirMap mitigates some of those costs by bringing it all
together.120
C. Avalara
Avalara is a startup that offers a number of regulatory democratization
solutions for startups and small businesses, all of whom need to file taxes.121
Unlike TurboTax and H&R Block, which help natural persons file their
individual tax returns, Avalara focuses on tax returns for businesses.122
The startup thereby helps its customers comply with Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) tax regulations.

120. AirMap specifically shows how RD helps young companies compete with old
ones. Over time, regulated companies develop relationships with their regulators. These
regulator-regulated relationships give regulated companies more access to the regulator’s
rulemaking process, help the regulated understand regulatory rules, and provide a way for
the regulated to exert influence when the regulator is determining the meaning of regulatory
standards. See Norm Champ, Building Effective Relationships with Regulators, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 22, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/22/
building-effective-relationships-with-regulators [https://perma.cc/4JTK-8GKS]. AirMap
levels that playing field. UAV operators have to comply with a complex web of regulations
promulgated by the FAA. See, e.g., Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations
(Part 107), F ED . A VIATION A DMIN. (July 23, 2018), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact
_sheets/ news_story.cfm?newsId=22615 [https://perma.cc/89KP-KP36]. These FAA UAV
regulations change frequently. See, e.g., FAA Highlights Changes for Recreational
Drones, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (May 16, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://www.faa.gov/news/
updates/?news Id=93769 [https://perma.cc/H4MG-5C3D]. Although large corporations,
such as Boeing, have influenced FAA rulemaking historically, today small startups like AirMap
are encouraging “collaborate acceleration.” Through collaborate acceleration, startup aviation
companies can engage collectively in lobbying the FAA and encouraging the agency to
take a more innovative approach. See AirMap Supporting NASA and FAA UTM Research
Projects, AIRMAP (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.airmap.com/airmap-supporting-nasautm-faa-upp-ipp-maap-research-projects [https://perma.cc/Y75Q-X43X]. This facilitates the
development of rules that permit young startup companies to innovate in the UAV market.
121. See We Live and Breathe Tax Compliance So You Don’t Have To, AVALARA,
https://www.avalara.com/us/en/about/trust.html [https://perma.cc/YWS4-FA6S].
122. See Avalara Products, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/us/en/products.html
[https://perma.cc/3G95-KMDU].
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The Avalara AvaTax product uses algorithmic devices to help e-commerce
startups and small businesses determine the taxes they owe, especially
regarding commerce across state lines.123
The Avalara Returns product allows businesses to “prepare[] and file
[their] sales and use tax returns with a higher degree of accuracy than doing
it” on their own.124 In other words, the product is designed to reduce error costs
and penalties for failure to comply with regulations. Moreover, Avalara
expressly acknowledges that their product meets the criteria for a regulatory
democratization solution: “Avalara pricing is volume-based and designed
to scale with your business.”125 This qualifies Avalara as a firm offering
an RD solution.
D. Cognigo
Cognigo, founded in 2016126 and acquired by NetApp in 2019,127 was
another business that described itself as a startup offering a RD solution.
Cognigo used artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to help
businesses protect their data and stay in compliance with regulations
involving data privacy,128 such as the General Data Protection Regulation

123. See The Power of Orange, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/us/en/about.html
[https://perma.cc/7CP5-8SYF].
124. Returns Preparation and Filing, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/us/en/products/
sales-and-use-tax/returns.html [https://perma.cc/PYE4-HXFK].
125. AvaTax Pricing, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/us/en/products/sales-anduse-tax/avatax/avatax-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/YLB4-7XNR].
126. See Cognigo, MEDICI GLOBAL, INC., https://gomedici.com/companies/cognigo
[https://perma.cc/XHV4-BHT7].
127. Joseph F. Kovar, NetApp Acquires Israeli Data Security Developer Cognigo, CRN
(May 30, 2019), https://www.crn.com/news/storage/netapp-acquires-israeli-data-securitydeveloper-cognigo [https://perma.cc/T8T9-KAXX]. Note that Section III.F refers to Cognigo’s
practices in the past tense because of its acquisition by NetApp, see id., although some of the
articles cited in this Section were published prior to the acquisition, see infra note 128.
128. Frederic Lardinois, Cognigo Raises $8.5M for its AI-Driven Data Protection
Platform, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 13, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/13/cognigo-raises8-5m-for-its-ai-driven-data-protection-platform/ [https://perma.cc/JA9B-ZJSS]; see also
Derrick L. Maultsby, Jr. & Jason L. Ott, The Future of Data Privacy: Corporate Compliance
in a Post-GDPR Global Market, CPO MAGAZINE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.
com/data-protection/the-future-of-data-privacy-corporate-compliance-in-a-post-gdprglobal-market [https://perma.cc/XB3Z-T38U] (“That lack of legal authority concerning
ownership of personal information has changed significantly with the recent enactment of
the General Data Protection Regulation (the ‘GDPR’) in the European Union (the ‘EU’).
In a broad sense, the GDPR has given EU residents power over their personal information.
The GDPR bill, which was passed in 2016 and took effect in May of 2018, grants EU
residents substantial rights with regard to their personal information[]” including “the right
to be forgotten[,] the right to access” the information and “the right to data portability.”).
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(GDPR).129 Cognigo
promise[d] that it c[ould] help businesses protect their critical data assets and
prevent personally identifiable information from leaking outside of the company’s
network. And it sa[id] it c[ould] do so without the kind of hands-on management
that’s often required in setting up these kinds of systems and managing them over
time.130

After the initial setup, Cognigo’s solution was entirely “human-free.”131
That means Cognigo had the capability of scaling massively. The company
achieved data security and compliance with GDPR in a fraction of the
time: cognitive computing allows a startup to become compliant in days
as opposed to months.132 Cognigo managed and secured critical data assets
through their DataSense program by using advanced machine learning
algorithms.133 The DataSense program was “trained to detect common
categories like payslips, patents, NDAs [non-disclosure agreements], and
contracts. Organizations c[ould] also provide their own data samples to
further train the model and customize it for their own needs.”134
The specifics regarding Cognigo’s AI technology and examples of its
use in the real world will require further study. Although founded recently
in 2016, the company was already acquired by NetApp in an effort to
“provide NetApp’s Cloud Volume Ontap with AI-driven compliance.135
That will be increasingly important given that over 80 percent of organizations
will fail to implement a comprehensive data governance scheme by
2021 . . . .”136 It is clear that Cognigo was involved in RD. Moreover,
Cognigo showed how AI technology can enable more RD solutions.

129. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016
O.J. (L119/1) [hereinafter “GDPR”].
130. See Lardinois, supra note 128.
131. Id.
132. See Cognigo, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/cognigo
[https://perma.cc/RZ4A-3TLC].
133. See Kovar, supra note 127.
134. Lardinois, supra note 128.
135. Kovar, supra note 127.
136. Id.
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E. Metomic
Metomic is a new startup that was founded in June of 2018137 to help
startups and small businesses comply with a new regulation, the GDPR,138
which was implemented on May 25, 2018.139 In fact, Metomic was founded
to be a GDPR solution for the multitude of small firms that could not
otherwise afford to comply with the new regulation.140
There are a number of firms offering GDPR solutions, but most offer
these solutions in the form of a traditional consulting arrangement, where
a consultant offers customized compliance advice.141 Much like the high
fixed cost of implementing customized HIPAA compliant email services
in a medical office,142 implementing customized GDPR compliant solutions
requires firms to expend significant resources up-front.
Metomic is different in that it offers tools that firms can use on a variable
basis. Its application program interfaces (APIs) can be licensed on a perdomain or per-user basis.143 For small firms who have low site usage, Metomic
is totally free.144 As the business grows, Metomic offers various packages
that range up to $250 per month per domain.145
The scalable, variable cost nature of Metomic’s GDPR solution distinguishes
it from traditional privacy consulting services, which have high up-front
fixed costs. As such, Metomic is an RD firm, whose business model is to
help startups and small businesses of all sizes—especially the smallest
ones—and to provide web solutions that comply with GDPR.

137. See Metomic, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/metomic
#section-overview [https://perma.cc/V9WC-V2CZ].
138. METOMIC, https://metomic.io [https://perma.cc/XZ8B-JAKH].
139. See Linda Hsu & Jena Valdetero, Data Breach Litigation Preparation: How Do
European Union Breach Notification Requirements Differ from the U.S.?, JD SUPRA (Feb.
6, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/data-breach-litigation-preparation-how-31454
[https://perma.cc/5BWC-789F].
140. See METOMIC, supra note 138.
141. See Amy Cross, Best GDPR Software Tools and Solutions, NGDATA (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.ngdata.com/gdpr-software-tools-and-solutions [https://perma.cc/AZJ7-2VXN]
(listing fifty-one services offering GDPR compliance solutions). For example, IBM Security,
Connexica, LogicManager, OneTrust, BWise, Forcepoint, Proofpoint, and ZenGRC all offer
GDPR solutions. Id.
142. See supra notes 80–83, 92–96 and accompanying text.
143. See Metomic, GOLDEN, https://golden.com/wiki/Metomic [https://perma.cc/QHS5LVBX]; Jonathan Freeman, What Is an API? Application Programming Interfaces Explained,
INFOWORLD (Aug. 8, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3269878/whatis-an-api-application-programming-interfaces-explained.html [https://perma.cc/PBE7-V92M].
144. Metomic, supra note 143.
145. See Choose the Plan That’s Right for You, METOMIC, https://metomic.madetogether.
co/pricing [https://perma.cc/6NLL-56ZB].
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F. Amazon Web Services (AWS)
While Amazon Web Services (AWS) is not a startup—Amazon is one
of the largest companies in the world146—many entrepreneurs use AWS
for compliance.147 From the interviews conducted in The Startup Survey,
researchers learned that AWS prominently factors into how startups are
able to compete with incumbents. AWS is a paradigm of RD, and it makes
a huge impact on the ability of startups to enter regulated markets.
AWS launched in 2006 to provide pay-as-you-go access to computing
power.148 Prior to AWS, data processing generally required the construction
of expensive server farms,149 a project that only large and well-funded
firms could undertake.150 AWS offered “data democratization” and provided
a scalable infrastructure that startups and small businesses could use.151
Moreover, AWS is certified as compliant in over fifty programs worldwide.152
In particular, AWS is compliant with GDPR.153 AWS users do not need
to take any additional action to get the benefit of AWS’s GDPR compliance.
This represents a huge savings of fixed regulatory information and compliance
costs to startups.154

146. See Alexis C. Madrigal, When Amazon Went from Big to Unbelievably Big,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/whenamazon-went-from-big-to-unbelievably-big [https://perma.cc/B69X-D2GT].
147. See About AWS, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws [https://perma.cc/
C7VV-YXLQ].
148. See id.
149. See Six Advantages of Cloud Computing, AMAZON, https://docs.aws.amazon.com/
whitepapers/latest/aws-overview/six-advantages-of-cloud-computing.html [https://perma.cc/
N98K-UA7W] (“Cloud computing lets you focus on your own customers, rather than on
the heavy lifting of racking, stacking, and powering servers.”).
150. See Ke-Wei Huang & Mengqi Wang, Firm-Level Productivity Analysis for
Software as a Service Companies, 2009 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 1, 5,
https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=icis2009 [https://perma.cc/
768W-CT8N] (“In an industry with economies of scale, firms will enjoy lower average
costs when the firm size is larger, rewarding larger firms and leading to a monopoly or
oligopoly in the end.”).
151. AWS Partner Story: Edmunds, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/partners/success/
edmunds-tableau [https://perma.cc/8RPN-X7PQ].
152. See AWS Compliance Programs, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/
programs [https://perma.cc/J4TZ-UQDJ].
153. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Center, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.
com/compliance/gdpr-center [https://perma.cc/HH75-H8ZW].
154. Cf. Oliver Smith, The GDPR Racket: Who’s Making Money From This $9bn
Business Shakedown?, FORBES (May 2, 2018, 2:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
oliversmith/2018/05/02/the-gdpr-racket-whos-making-money-from-this-9bn-business-
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AWS provides many services, but their central product is Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2).155 As the name implies, EC2 makes data processing
more flexible by allowing users to rent virtual computers on which to run
their own computer applications. Users pay by the second to use servers
that AWS owns.156
This proved to be a win-win for Amazon and for the marketplace; over
150,000 developers,157 17,500 nonprofits,158 2,400 educational institutions,159
and 5,000 government agencies160 have used AWS, while AWS generated
over $25.6 billion in sales in 2018.161
In economic terms, AWS changed the cost curve for data processing in
a way that especially benefitted startups and small businesses. Prior to
AWS, data processing required a huge upfront investment, or a “fixed cost,”
in that the expense of the server farm must be incurred before any production
or sales of data occurred.162 Pre-sales startups may not have income to
pay for these initial fixed costs, whereas incumbent firms with multiple
revenue streams can cover this investment relatively easily. Additionally,
some of these upfront costs are “sunk” in that they can never be recovered

shakedown/#70e8a78234a2 [https://perma.cc/882T-PZYB]. Forbes reported that the world’s
Fortune 500 companies spend a total of $7.8 billion on GDPR compliance, an average of
$16 million per firm. See id. Startups would likely spend less per firm, but this still paints
a picture of the huge compliance cost for GDPR.
155. See Amazon EC2, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ [https://perma.cc/
YCE6-PTX8].
156. See Amazon EC2 Pricing, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/ [https://
perma.cc/T7TB-MMFJ] (“With On-Demand instances, you pay for compute capacity by
the hour or the second depending on which instances you run. . . . With per-second billing,
you pay for only what you use.”).
157. See Savia Lobo, Why AWS Is the Preferred Cloud Platform for Developers
Working with Big Data, PACKT (June 7, 2018), https://hub.packtpub.com/why-aws-is-theprefered-cloud-platform-for-developers-working-with-big-data [https://perma.cc/G7EV67GD].
158. See Announcing AWS Cloud Credits for Nonprofits with TechSoup Global,
AMAZON (Mar. 4, 2016), https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/announcing-awscloud-credits-for-nonprofits-with-techsoup-global/ [https://perma.cc/9GA5-L46Y].
159. See AWS Educate, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/education/awseducate [https://
perma.cc/X5LS-FX8R].
160. See The Trusted Cloud for Government, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/
government-education/government [https://perma.cc/A3S2-5QVM].
161. Alison Griswold, Amazon Web Services Brought in More Money than McDonald’s in
2018, QUARTZ (Feb. 1, 2018), https://qz.com/1539546/amazon-web-services-brought-inmore-money-than-mcdonalds-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/S3D2-ADEC]; How Much is
Amazon Web Services Worth on a Standalone Basis, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2019, 3:45 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/28/how-much-is-amazon-webservices-worth-on-a-standalone-basis/#41b7bef8bbb7 [https://perma.cc/E4D9-DL2M].
162. See STEVEN A. GREENLAW & DAVID SHAPIRO, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
167 (2d ed. 2018) (“At zero production, the fixed costs . . . are still present.”).
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if the project fails.163 Startups and small businesses cannot manage the
risk of losing sunk costs to the degree that incumbents can.164
AWS thus exhibits a strong form of RD that can have a major impact
on startup entry and post-entry growth and innovation in markets regulated
by GDPR and other privacy laws. Incumbents may prefer industrial
organizations that demand large sunk costs so they can fend off startups.165
AWS helps startups compete against incumbents by transforming sunk
costs into variable costs.166 AWS converted the up-front fixed costs of building
a GDPR-compliant server farm into the variable cost of server access,
which scales in step with output or sales.167 This data democratization helps
startups process data and comply with privacy regulations at a per unit cost
similar to their incumbent competitors. Thanks to AWS’s RD solution,
startups can pay as they grow, instead of making big investments upfront.
Otherwise, the large fixed costs of creating data servers that are compliant
with the new, complex, and dynamic web of privacy regulations would
benefit high-volume incumbents over pre-sales startups.
As discussed above, fixed costs, and especially sunk costs, have a disparately
negative impact on startups.168 It is well-documented that converting fixed

163. See JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 185 (Donna Battista et al. eds., 5th
ed. 2009) (“Because the equipment has no alternative use, the historical cost of buying that
capital is a sunk cost: an expenditure that cannot be recovered.”).
164. See Robert S. Pindyck, Sunk Costs and Risk-Based Barriers to Entry 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14755, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w14755.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5PV-FYCN] (“Thus large sunk costs are clearly an entry
barrier; by creating scale economies, they lead to an industry equilibrium with relatively
few firms.”).
165. See Richard Schmalensee, Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry 2 (Mass.
Inst. of Tech. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4457-04, 2004), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=486944 [https://perma.cc/KN4W-J4HG] (“But unless entry involves
sunk costs—which cannot be recovered or, if amortized and treated as a flow, cannot be
avoided if exit occurs—contestability theory teaches that scale economies do not suffice
to permit established firms to hold price above cost without attracting (hit-and-run) entry.”); see
also JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 252 (2d ed. 1968) (“[T]he condition[s] of
entry [are] the extent to which, in the long run, established firms can elevate their selling prices
above the minimal average costs of production and distribution . . . without inducing potential
entrants to enter the industry.”).
166. For a discussion of the advantages of variable costs, see Schmalansee, supra note
165, at 5–6.
167. See PERLOFF, supra note 163, at 186 (“A firm’s variable cost (VC) is the production
expense that changes with the quantity of output produced.”).
168. See Pindyck, supra note 164, at 1.
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costs into variable costs can enhance competition.169 By definition, fixed
costs are a type of entry barrier, as they are costs that must be borne by a
startup trying to enter the market, but not by an incumbent who is already
in the market.170 In antitrust law, it is axiomatic that markets with lower
fixed costs are more competitive.171 Moreover, this competition results in
lower prices and higher quality products.172 Indeed, one reason why many
startups attempted to enter the software industry in the dot.com era is that
software engineering firms were able to shift most of their costs to variable
costs.173
Therefore, AWS provides a vital service to startups by enabling the
conversion of fixed and sunk costs of regulatory compliance to variable
costs, which also equalizes the incidence of these costs on startups vis-àvis incumbents.
IV. ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY DEMOCRATIZATIONS
What is common about the regulations that RD startups have addressed?
Answering this question may provide insights toward designing efficient
business regulations. Startups have developed RD compliance solutions
for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airspace regulations of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax code, and
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). What is common about
these regulations? Section A will answer that question. Section B will

169. See, e.g., Yunchuan Liu & Rajeev K. Tyagi, Outsourcing to Convert Fixed
Costs into Variable Costs: A Competitive Analysis, 34 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 252, 252
(2017) (“[Outsourcing] allows the outsourcing firm to reduce its fixed cost[s] such as
expenditures on equipment, information technology, fixed salaries of employees, etc., and
convert those into a variable cost in the form of the purchase price that the outsourcing
firm then pays the outside industry.”).
170. See William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers,
and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405, 416 (1981) (“[F]ixed costs of sufficient
magnitude can effectively prevent entry, which suggests that they might be classed as a type of
entry barrier”).
171. See Nirmalya Kumar, Strategies to Fight Low-Cost Rivals, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategies-to-fight-low-cost-rivals [https://perma.cc/
3AT8-EK8X].
172. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMPETITION COUNTS:
HOW CONSUMERS WIN WHEN BUSINESSES COMPETE 2 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/attachments/competition-counts/pdf-0116_competition-counts.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4RNG-2RQK].
173. See J.J. Dolado, On the Problem of the Software Cost Function, 43 INFO. &
SOFTWARE TECH. 61, 69 (2001) (“In most cases, the marginal return is so low that asserting
that economies or diseconomies of scale exist is very questionable.”).
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apply that answer to an analysis of when RD is likely to arise and foster
competition in regulated industries.
A. The Nature of Regulation
HIPAA, FAA UAS, GDPR, and the IRS tax code are all complex, rulebased systems of regulation. These are distinguishable from simple rules
and standards. Figure 2 illustrates how complex rules fit into the taxonomy
of regulations.

COMPLEX
RULE

COMPLEX
STANDARD

SIMPLE
RULE

SIMPLE
STANDARD

Figure 2. Taxonomy of Regulations.

1. Rules Versus Standards
As shown in Figure 3, there are four categories of regulations across
two dimensions: simple/rule, complex/rule, simple/standard, and complex/
standard.174 RD seems to arise only in response to complex rules. Unpacking
the meaning of this finding requires a brief discussion on rules versus standards.
174. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 566 (1992).
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The economics of rules versus standards usually begins by distinguishing ex
ante versus ex post decision-making.175 Ex ante costs are incurred before
an action is taken.176 Ex post costs are incurred afterward.177 These concepts
map neatly on to a simplified version of rules and standards.178
Rules are determined ex ante, in advance.179 For example, “Speed Limit
70 MPH” is a rule.180 The speed limit is determined in advance. This requires
regulators to pay an upfront rulemaking cost,181 such as by surveying
roadways, posting signs, updating equipment, and monitoring noncompliance.
The regulated must also bear an up-front cost to become informed about
the speed limit and monitor for changes.182 Although rules also have ex
post costs including detection and enforcement,183 breaches of rules are
relatively easy to adjudicate, so more of the costs of rules are incurred up
front.
In contrast, standards are determined ex post, after the fact. On highways
in Montana, with no posted speed limits, drivers must still be “reasonable.”184
What does that mean? In this initial state, a standard is an abstraction, and
it does not have a concrete meaning. Only after someone is pulled over
for driving 120 MPH through rural Montana and is adjudicated to have
been driving unreasonably does this standard have a specific context.
Over time, however, as cases involving unreasonable speed in Montana
are adjudicated, the collective impact of this precedential case law is to
have predictive value:185 if 99 of 100 people who were pulled over for driving
120 MPH were adjudicated to be unreasonable, we can now determine with
sufficient confidence ex ante that 120 MPH is unreasonably fast.
Thus, standards have the advantage of generating rule-making costs only
as needed.186 Unlike rules, where every scenario must be accounted for in
175. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 74 (2000). Ex ante decisions are those which are made with
the information the actor possesses at the time. Id. Some ex ante punishments are designed
to mitigate behavior that would increase the probability of an undesirable outcome, such
as punishing drunk driving. Id. However, ex post laws punish behavior based on the
undesirable outcome observed and therefore exploit an actor’s personal, private information by
having the actor use his knowledge to conform to the law, such as imposing tort liability for
damage done. Id. at 74–75.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Kaplow, supra note 174, at 559–60.
179. See id. at 589.
180. See id. at 565.
181. See id. at 568–69.
182. See id. at 569.
183. See id. at 570.
184. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303(3) (2019).
185. See Kaplow, supra note 174, at 577–79.
186. See id. at 610 & n.148.
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advance, a standard is only defined when its boundaries are tested. Moreover,
it gains definition from the real world, and thus is most likely to comport
with reasonable expectations.
2. Simplicity Versus Complexity
Whether a rule or a standard, a regulation can also be simple or complex.187
The complexity of a regulation is related to the number or amount of facts
that must be considered in order to apply the rule.188 In the case of rules,
complexity is relatively easy to illustrate. For example, “Car Parking $1
Per Hour” is a simple rule in that it only requires one fact, namely, how
long the car was parked. Parking rules can be more complex of course, such
as: “Car Parking $1 Per Hour, no parking 8:30 am – 9:30 am on weekdays,
free parking 6 pm – 6 am and on Sundays.”
Complex rules generally cost more to develop than simple rules. Complexity
with regards to standards is a bit harder to quantify—which is unsurprising
given the inherently qualitative nature of standards—but here again an
illustration helps demonstrate the distinction. One of the simplest standards
may be the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishments:189 “It does
not take most people very long to decide whether a punishment is cruel.”190
A more complex standard may be found in the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. This doctrine, which is also known as detrimental reliance, was
established in the late nineteenth century by judges who felt compelled to
enforce promises that did not rise to the level of contracts at law.191 A
common articulation of this standard is as follows: “A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.”192 This is a complex standard because reasonable people
often disagree when “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the

187. See id. at 566.
188. See, e.g., id. at 565.
189. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
190. John Harrison, Richard Epstein’s Big Picture, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 862 (1996).
191. See Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and
Commercial Uncertainty Before Williston’s Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 500 (2004);
Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 275–
76, 275 n.23 (1996).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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promise.”193 Making such a determination usually requires a great deal of
fact-finding and a full-blown bench trial.194 This makes complex standards
quite expensive to administer in comparison to simple standards.
3. Evolution of Standards into Rules
However, the discussion above about simplicity versus complexity was
oversimplified in that it did not take into account the impact of precedent
over time. Any cost-benefit analysis of rules versus standards is incomplete
if it assumes that laws are static, and that each case is a matter of first
impression. This is of course not how our common law legal system works.
Rather, over time, precedent, whether binding or simply persuasive, informs
the application of regulations.195
Recall the distinction of two speed limits, a “70 MPH” rule and a “reasonable
and prudent speed” standard.196 In a matter of first impression, a judge would
need to conduct extensive fact-finding to determine whether a driver violated
the standard-based speed limit. But, over time, as similar cases are decided,
this vague standard develops characteristics of a complex rule. For example,
if a judge determines that a driver operating a high-end sports car at 120
MPH on a clear day with excellent driving conditions was driving unreasonably,
this effectively creates a rule that sets an upper bound to what could be
considered a reasonable speed. Later, another judge determines that a
driver was imprudent when driving 80 MPH in heavy snow, but another
driver was prudent when driving 90 MPH to take his friend to the hospital.
After years of this standard being on the books, something resembling
a complex rule evolves. For instance, this hypothetical speed limit standard
begins to have rule-like features such as an absolute 120 MPH speed limit
in all cases, a lower 80 MPH speed limit in daytime snow, and an exception
for emergency services.
B. Rules, Standards, and Regulatory Democratization
The case studies of RD described in Part II share a common thread.
Although they address different regulations—HIPAA, FAA UAV regulations,
the IRS tax code, and GDPR—they all address the same type of regulation:
complex, rule-based regulations. This Section B explains why complex,

193. See id.; Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel,
49 HASTINGS L. J. 1191, 1218–19 (1998).
194. See generally Knapp, supra note 193 (providing an overview of the Second
Restatement and analyzing multiple promissory estoppel claims that went to trial).
195. See Kaplow, supra note 174, at 577–79.
196. See supra notes 176–84 and accompanying text.
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rule-based regulations are most likely to encourage the development of
RD technology.
In short, computer programs are good at processing rules but incompetent
at exercising discretionary standards. Now that computer technology has
scaled to provide regulatory compliance for large numbers of small firms,
it is worth revisiting the economics behind the rules versus standards
debate to see whether technological change in information and enforcement
costs have impacted the cost-benefit analysis.
1. Simple Rules and RD
The Startup Study did not find evidence of large-scale RD in response
to simple rules. However, that does not mean that simple rules are inferior
to complex ones. Rather, it tends to show that simple rules may promote
efficient compliance even without technological solutions. For example,
numeric speed limits are simple rules that have been reasonably efficient
despite a lack of technological advancement.197 The non-existence of RD
in response to simple rules may simply show these rules tend to be efficient
without further intervention.
Moreover, when rules are relatively simple, regulators often create their
own compliance technologies.198 Although this phenomenon is itself a subject
for another paper, this Article has alluded to the emergence of regulatory
technology that lowers information and enforcement costs.
While complex regulations may foster RD, they may inhibit other desirable
business activities. Complexity is not a good unto itself. As stated earlier,
holding everything else constant, a simpler regulation will have less of a
disparate impact on startups than a complex regulation.199 Complex regulations
generally have higher information costs, and startups are less able to distribute
those information costs than incumbents.200 By lowering information costs,
the startups’ disadvantage is likewise decreased.201
197. See generally Tom Sohrweide, The Truth About Speed Limits, Explained by an
Engineer, SHORT ELLIOTT HENDRICKSON INC., http://www.sehinc.com/news/truth-about-speedlimits-explained-engineer [https://perma.cc/3EA4-DN63] (explaining that speed limits do
not dictate speeds but rather reflect the way drivers behave on the road).
198. See Richard Williams & Mark Adams, Regulatory Overload, 103 MERCATUS
ON POL’Y 1, 3 (2012), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Regulatory_Overload_Williams
Adams_MOP103.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8T7-GLRF].
199. See supra notes 21–24, 168 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
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However, not all regulations can easily be made simple. Life is complex.202
There are two approaches to regulating a complex situation: granting a
great deal of discretion to the regulator to figure out the application of
a rule in each specific scenario or drafting complex regulations that account
for many different scenarios in advance.203 The latter is the lesser of two
evils, at least insofar as RD is concerned, as the more complex but inherently
knowable regulation can be resolved to some level of certainty through
the process of RD.
2. RD’s Incompatibility with Standards
Problematically for RD, “reasonable” standards cannot usually be
determined algorithmically in advance by technology. What speed should
a self-driving car operate on a new vacant highway in central Montana?
How should the car know what is a “reasonable” speed? And who should be
liable if that speed turns out after the fact to be unreasonable?
It is the providence of lawyers and consultants to opine on the best
response to uncertainty, whereas computers cannot replace human judgment.204
Standards, in other words, present a computational problem.
Regulatory discretion—that is, the degree to which regulators can make
decisions on a case-by-case basis—inhibits RD. The introduction of human
discretion into the equation makes it very difficult or impossible to have
generic solutions to regulatory problems. Technology is still no match for
the whim of the bureaucrat. Even AI technology has difficulty in predicting
human behavior.205
Discretion is often cloaked in vagueness. Vague terms are hard to understand
and impossible to code, which drives up the cost of inexperience while
simultaneously prohibiting RD. Discretion is likewise problematic because
incumbents generally have longer relationships and more significant working
histories with regulators. Incumbents may also have more political influence,
possibly due to their role in creating local jobs or donating to political
campaigns.206
202. But see OSCAR WILDE, EPIGRAMS OF OSCAR WILDE 66 (2007) (“Life is not
complex. We are complex. Life is simple and the simple thing is the right thing.”).
203. See Williams & Adams, supra note 198, at 1, 3.
204. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Jim Mainprice, Rafi Hayne & Dmitry Berenson, Goal Set Inverse
Optimal Control and Iterative Re-planning for Predicting Human Reaching Motions in
Shared Workspaces, 32 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS TRANSACTIONS ON
ROBOTICS 897, 897 (2016). But see, e.g., Alex Pentland & Andrew Liu, Modeling and Prediction
of Human Behavior, 11 NEURAL COMPUTATION 229, 229 (1999) (demonstrating that a
model of human behavior can improve human-machine systems).
206. See Jonathan A. Knee, Review: Why Start-Ups Need a Regulatory Strategy to
Succeed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/business/dealbook/
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Moreover, creating a scalable solution for a discretionary regulation
would be a difficult task for an enterprising RD startup. Discretionary
regulations include language such as “reasonable” and thereby require a
judge or some arbiter to determine what reasonable means in a certain
case. 207 Such regulations do not have general rules that can be easily
extrapolated and applied in many different contexts, and so, these
discretionary rule problems would be harder to solve for a wider range of
firms who operate in more disparate fields than a single large firm.
Rules, however, are within the domain of the computational sciences.
Modern computers can make short work even of very complex rules. When
regulations are rule-based, RD technology can solve them with lower
information and error costs.
Simple rules may be better at producing compliance and low cost, but
some rules cannot be so simplified.208 Simple standards are more feasible
to implement, but their discretionary nature is suboptimal for an algorithmic
approach. Moreover, their ambiguity may encourage a different process:
regulatory entrepreneurship.209 The Startup Study revealed that complex
regulatory standards often result in rational entrepreneurs’ willful ignorance
and noncompliance. See Figure 3 for an illustration of regulatory predictors
of RD emergence.

fixer-regulatory-hacking-review.html [https://perma.cc/F5YP-GBBA]; see also Eyal-Cohen,
supra note 10, at 863–64 (“Whereas old-timers may be able to spread regulatory costs over
their output or longevity, newcomers are more likely limited in their ability to mitigate
these costs due to structural obstacles. . . . The effects of regulatory asymmetries on
newcomers are palpable.”).
207. See supra Section IV.A.3.
208. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 174, at 589–90.
209. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 17, at 383, 385.
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Figure 3. Predictors of regulatory democratization.

3. Complex Rules and RD
In contrast with regulatory discretion, which is likely to inhibit RD, regulatory
complexity—the number of words, lines, provisions, etc. in a rule—does
not appear to hinder RD. In fact, there are theoretical reasons to believe
that regulatory complexity promotes RD.210 The Startup Study’s qualitative
findings also support this.211
The Startup Study shows evidence of RD in the face of complex regulations.
Consider the three regulations addressed by the startups in our case study:
GDPR, HIPAA, and FAA UAS. They are all highly complex regulations.
Just the official title of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)212
contains more words and characters than portions of the Sherman Act that
make conspiracy illegal.213 The GDPR spans eighty-eight pages and is
translated into twenty-four languages.214 A common refrain in the legal news
is that “GDPR compliance can be complex.”215
HIPAA is also very complex. The U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services (HHS) Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule is eighteen pages
long, not including endnotes.216 The rule itself is so complex that HHS

210. See supra Section IV.B.1.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See GDPR, supra note 129.
213. Compare id., with Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
214. See GDPR, supra note 129; Jeroen Terstegge, GDPR: Lost in Translation?, INT’L
ASS’N PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (May 1, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-lost-in-translation
[https://perma.cc/MP86-BKY8].
215. Top Five Concerns with GDPR Compliance, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomson
reuters.com/en/insights/articles/top-five-concerns-gdpr-compliance [https://perma.cc/3NJ8E4LM].
216. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J5QJ-3WPU].
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promulgated a HIPAA Administrative Simplification.217 However, that
simplification is itself so complex that it is scattered in three different places
throughout the Code of Federal Regulations.218 The combined text is 105
pages.219
Regulation of drones is even more complex because it involves a
network of federal, state, and local regulations on unmanned aircraft.220
While the federal government has “exclusive sovereignty of airspace” over
the United States,221 there are actually six classes of airspace, depending
on the space’s height above sea level, height above ground level, and other
factors, plus special use airspace, and other airspace areas. 222 These
classifications are not static but may vary on a day-to-day or even hourby-hour basis.223 Moreover, their use may be coordinated by a controller
and conditioned on weather and other external factors.224 In addition to
this complex regulation of public airspace, drone operators must also consider
private airspace.225 In short, we see regulatory democratization in highly
complex regulatory environments.
This qualitative evidence supports the hypothesis that entrepreneurs may
see a greater market opportunity in tailoring their service to complex

217. See The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. D EP ’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/E3HTU6WL].
218. See id.; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164(A), (E) (2013).
219. See HIPAA Administrative Simplification, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–164 (2013).
220. See OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) 1–3 (2015), https://www.faa.gov/
uas/resources/policy_library/media/UAS_Fact_Sheet_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y283-9AVG]
(providing an overview of information about the federal regulatory framework for UAVs).
221. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2018).
222. F LIGHT S TANDARDS S ERV ., F ED . A VIATION ADMIN ., P ILOTS H ANDBOOK OF
AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, at 15-2 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVC2-HG9J].
223. Matthew Johnston, Differences Between Airspace Classifications, CAL. AERONAUTICAL
U.: CALAERO B LOG (Nov. 8, 2018), https://calaero.edu/differences-between-airspaceclassifications/ [https://perma.cc/9N2C-B4J9].
224. See id.
225. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). In United States v.
Causby, the Supreme Court held that landowners have “exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere” and “[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the
space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.” Id. This is
a notable deviation from Roman law, which held: Cuius est solum, eius est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos (“Whoever owns the land it is theirs up to the heavens and down
to hell.”). A DICTIONARY OF LAW 166–67 (Jonathan Law ed., 8th ed. 2015).
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regulations rather than simple ones.226 There may generally be a trade-off
between discretion and complexity. While prior scholarship seems to assume
that startups would generally benefit from simpler regulations,227 this does
not account for the discretion/complexity trade-off. In fact, RD has been
observed only in industries whose regulations are highly complex. Holding
everything else—including discretion—constant, a simpler regulation is
more RD friendly than a complex one, as the RD can offer a greater contribution
by lowering regulatory information costs. Entrepreneurs may see a greater
market opportunity in providing solutions to complex regulations rather
than simple ones.228 As mentioned above, so long as the regulation is ultimately
comprehensible, its complexity will not necessarily stifle RD.
There are two countervailing issues that counsel against the use of
complex regulations to foster RD. The first is an endogeneity problem, namely,
that discretion and complexity generally correlate inversely.229 A regulation
that gives regulators a great deal of discretion can often be much simpler
than a regulation accounting for most cases—although regulatory simplicity
may have no correlation with regulatory burden.230
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
This Article is not the first to recognize that regulations have a disparate
impact upon startups.231 Others have proposed various solutions to this
problem.232 This new finding contributes to the conversation on how to make
regulations better for entrepreneurs and encourage small business innovation.
In particular, this Part discusses how regulatory democratization has an
226. Suggestions for testing this hypothesis are found in the Conclusions, infra notes
292–97.
227. See supra Section IV.B.1.
228. Suggestions for testing this hypothesis are found in the Conclusions, infra notes
292–97.
229. See supra Section IV.B.2.
230. For example, our fundamental antitrust regulation is incredibly simple. The
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits restraints of trade in just one sentence: “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2018). Antitrust law holds that a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade is
illegal. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting). However, there is still much dispute over what restraints are “reasonable”
in various contexts, each subject to a full-blown jury trial with fact-intensive analysis. See
Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman Act, 30 CAP. U.
L. REV. 125, 128–30 (2002). In fact, despite antitrust law being founded on one of the simplest
statutes in the books, antitrust cases are some of the most expensive to litigate. Jonathan M.
Jacobson, From the Section Chair: Tackling the Time and Cost of Antitrust Litigation, 32
ANTITRUST 3, 3–4 (2017).
231. See, e.g., Pollman & Barry, supra note 17.
232. See, e.g., id. at 430–47.
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impact on three proposed solutions: regulatory sandboxes, information-sharing
networks, and tax credits. Deregulation is also addressed.
A. Regulatory Sandboxes
Regulatory sandboxes are touted as a promising way for regulators to
partner with startups in experimenting with more efficient regulations.233
In this scheme, a regulator grants a specific startup a variance on a regulation
or order to permit that startup to experiment with a new technology in a
live environment for a limited time.234 Theoretically, this should provide
safe spaces for innovation.235
To date, however, reality has not matched this promise. Indeed, the
finding of RD suggests that regulatory sandboxes are theoretically unlikely
to improve the disparate impact of regulation on startups and especially
small businesses.236
To the extent that the regulatory sandbox approach has been employed
at all, its use has generally been limited to financial technologies.237 The
regulatory sandbox process is most predominately employed by the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA),238 a financial regulator in the United Kingdom
who operates independently of the UK government,239 much like the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) does in the United States.240 The
FCA’s process allows innovative firms to approach the FCA via its Innovation
233. The Role of Regulatory Sandboxes in Fintech Innovation, supra note 31.
234. Mike Faden, Regulatory Sandboxes Provide “Safe Spaces” for Fintech Payment
Services Innovation, AM. EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/
articles/regulatory-sandboxes-for-innovative-payment-solutions [https://perma.cc/P2SQLDFD] (citing FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOX 9 (2015), https://www.
fca.org.uk/ publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HPU-EWFR]).
235. See id.
236. See supra Part IV.
237. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 31, at 579; Faden, supra note 234. Note that legal
scholarship actually defines regulatory sandbox narrowly to pertain to financial technology.
E.g., Allen, supra note 31, at 579 (2019) (“A regulatory sandbox allows fintech startups to
conduct a limited test of their products with fewer regulatory constraints, less risk of regulatory
enforcement action, and ongoing guidance from regulators. . . .”).
238. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 234.
239. About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/
print/about/the-fca [https://perma.cc/924V-2UVF].
240. About FINRA, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, https://www.finra.org/about
[https://perma.cc/TN3K-X8YJ] (“FINRA is not part of the government. We’re a not-forprofit organization authorized by Congress to protect America’s investors by making sure
the broker-dealer industry operates fairly and honestly.”).
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Hub and request a no enforcement action letter (NAL),241 obtain individual
guidance,242 or seek a waiver243 to offer novel financial products or services.
Congress showed some interest in implementing a regulatory sandbox
in the United States.244 Also known as the McHenry Bill for its sponsor,
Rep. Patrick McHenry (R-NC), the Financial Services Innovation Act would
create a new Financial Services Innovation Office (FSIO) in each of the
federal financial agencies.245 Each FSIO would have a process whereby
startups could propose an alternative compliance strategy for a financial
innovation that serves the public interest, improves access to financial
products and services, and does not present systemic risk while promoting
consumer protection.246 But the bill, introduced in 2016, has not yet seen
any action in the House of Representatives.247
Moreover, such a bill is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the
disparate impact of regulation on startups. First of all, the McHenry Bill
is limited to FinTech.248 Second, based on the length of time that the McHenry
Bill has already sat in Congress, and the time-consuming process that

241. FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 234, at 9 (“We could issue a NAL stating
that no FCA enforcement action will be taken against testing activities where we are reasonably
satisfied that the activities do not breach our requirements or harm our objectives. We think it
would be appropriate for the FCA to reserve the right to close the trial. The FCA’s commitment
not to take enforcement action applies to the period from the issue of the NAL until the
testing is completed or closed by the FCA. The US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) is implementing a similar policy.”).
242. Id. (“In addition to NALs, the FCA can issue individual guidance to a firm on
the interpretation of applicable rules in respect of testing activities the firm may be
carrying out. If the firm acts in accordance with this guidance, it will give them certainty
that the FCA would not take action against them.”).
243. Id. (“Where it is clear that testing activities do not meet our rules but the firm
can meet the waiver test and the rules are within the FCA’s power to waive, the FCA can
waive or modify particular rules for sandbox firms. A waiver or modification would allow
what would otherwise be a temporary breach of our rules. The FCA is limited in what it can
waive by EU legislative requirements. This is not an option for firms not regulated
under FSMA (e.g. payment institutions).”).
244. See Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016).
245. See id. The federal financial industries contemplated by this bill are: CFPB,
CFTC, FCA, FDIC, FHFA, FRB, FTC, HUD, OCC, NCUA, Treasury, and SEC. AM. LAND
TITLE ASS’N, FINANCIAL SERVICES INNOVATION ACT 6 (2016), https://www.alta.org/file.
cfm?name=McHenry-Bill-Explainer [https://perma.cc/4M7Q-M4EP].
246. Id. at 14–15.
247. JD Alois, Financial Services Innovation Act Seeks to Mandate Innovation Offices
in Federal Agencies that Impact Fintech, CROWD F UND I NSIDER (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2019/10/153145-financial-services-innovation-actseeks-to-mandate-innovation-offices-in-federal-agencies-the-impact-fintech/ [https://perma.cc/
RBQ2-N77J].
248. See McHenry, Meeks Introduce Fintech Bill to Encourage Greater Financial
Inclusion, U.S. CONGRESSMAN PATRICK MCHENRY (July 19, 2017), https://mchenry.house.
gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398631 [https://perma.cc/5TBK-7YMW].
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would be required for an agency to process a proposal for an alternative
compliance strategy, it is hard to believe that this cumbersome process
will be fast enough to support startup innovation.
But most troublesome is the ambiguous nature of the standards for
having a regulatory sandbox proposal approved. The McHenry Bill and
other proposals for regulatory sandboxes give a broad range of discretion
to regulatory agencies.249 Discretion is the functional opposite of certainty.
Startups will have a hard time determining in advance if or when a request
will be granted. Moreover, incumbents are more able to take advantage of
this process. Large established firms, that already have relationships with
regulators, will be in a better position to get their requests approved as opposed
to startups who are not familiar with the process. Even scholars who are
proponents of the sandbox approach recognize that incumbents could be
able to game the system.250
RD teaches us that vague standards and regulatory discretion are anathema
to entrepreneurial innovation. It is the large and old companies who have
established relationships with regulators who are most likely to benefit from
sandboxes. For most startups and small businesses, however, these bogeys
are regulatory sand traps.
B. Regulatory Information Sharing Regimes
Several scholars have theorized that regulatory costs—especially information
costs—could be mitigated by either mandatory or voluntary networks that
share information about regulations. For example, “connected contracts”
could lead to collaborative economic activity.251 One scholar even described
such information-sharing networks in the real world.252

249. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 31, at 582.
250. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 910 (“[T]he government will need to place
safeguards to prevent certain old-timers from gaming and using such regulatory sandboxes
to their benefit.”).
251. G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47
UCLA L. REV. 887, 894–95 (2000) (“This metaphor, called ‘connected contracts,’ emphasizes
the complex interactions among all of the participants in an economic venture. . . . Connected
contracts broadens the scope of analysis to invite attention to the cooperation, conflict,
competition, and compromise among equity investors, lenders, managers, workers, suppliers,
customers, and all others who contribute to an economic endeavor . . . .”).
252. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
717, 727 (2010) (“Silicon Valley is home to unique sociological networks and an open and
sharing entrepreneurial culture, even among high-tech competitors.”).
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But there are fundamental theoretical problems that would preclude
regulatory information sharing networking from being a stable solution to
the problem of the disparate impact of regulation on startups.
First and foremost, this would necessitate sharing of information.
However, startups are in competition with each other. Knowledge about
regulations would give one startup a competitive advantage over others.253
So, why would one startup voluntarily share information that was costly
for it to obtain with another competing startup? Generally, competitors do
not give away their competitive advantage to rivals for nothing.254 Indeed,
doing so could amount to corporate waste and a violation of fiduciary
duties.255
Perhaps they would share information if there is some expectation of
quid pro quo. Even if this is the case, such information sharing relationships
are unlikely to be stable. Once groups of startups reach any reasonable size,
they are prone to free-riding problems, coordination problems, and collective
action problems.256 These groups are similar to conspiracies, oligopolies,
and cabals, which are notoriously unstable and prone to cheating.257
Moreover, such information sharing groups may not even be legal.
Competitors sharing information may violate antitrust laws.258 If any
competitor is left out of the group, it may claim that its omission constitutes
an illegal group boycott, a violation of the Sherman Act.259 This is not mere
theorizing. Such a case came before the Supreme Court in 1985, when Pacific
Stationary was ostracized from a group of office suppliers called Northwest
Wholesale Stationers.260 In that case, the Supreme Court held that an
information sharing group may violate antitrust law where it possesses
“market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective

253. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 904 (“[R]egulatory information is a competitive
advantage that many newcomers would prefer not to share once obtained.”).
254. See, e.g., id. But see Ibrahim, supra note 252, at 727 (noting an open source trend
in Silicon Valley).
255. ALAN PALMITER,FRANK PARTNOY,&ELIZABETH POLLMAN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 84–85 (3d ed. 2019).
256. See George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories
of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 359, 359, 364–65 (1974).
257. See Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 19 & n.6.
258. Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional
Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 352 (2009) (“A common
facilitating practice that has been found to violate the Sherman Act is an agreement between
competitors to exchange information on prices or output. Such coordination draws scrutiny
because it enables illegal collusion even in the absence of an explicit agreement to collude.”).
259. See id. at 347–48.
260. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
285–88 (1985).
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competition.”261 Such information about regulations could be considered
a business element necessary for effective competition.262
In sum, regulatory information sharing networks are rarely observed in
the world, theoretically unstable, and potentially illegal as a violation of
antitrust law if all firms do not have equal access to the information.
Therefore, they are not a viable solution to the problem of the disparate
impact of regulations on startups.
C. Tax Credits for Startups
Regulation and taxation are two sides of the same coin. They both represent
a cost whose incidence may be borne by either the supplier or the consumer,
depending on the ratio of the elasticities of supply and demand.263 Accordingly,
some have advocated for either additional taxes on incumbents,264 or a tax
credit toward startups.265 This is not an article on tax policy per se, so it will
provide only a brief discussion of why both of these tax-based solutions
are unlikely to work.
Tax burdens on incumbents generally have the impact of increasing prices
and lowering quality for consumers.266 However, this negative externality
can be countered with a positive impact, if such taxation simultaneously
increases competition. Whether or not this is likely to occur is a very

261. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 903 (citing Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472
U.S. at 290).
262. Id.
263. Who pays for a tax, more formally known as the “incidence of cost,” was first
presented in 1924 by economist T.N. Carver, who asked the question, “Who bears the
burden of extra costs?” T.N. Carver, The Incidence of Costs, 34 ECON. J. 576, 576, 588
(1924). When does the producer, the consumer, or some ratio of both bear the extra costs?
“The general answer is, that it depends upon the commodity on which the new charge is
laid, or, more specifically, upon the ratio of the elasticity of the supply of the commodity
to that of the demand for it.” Id. at 578.
264. See JOSEPH W. ROSENBERG & DONALD B. MARRON, TAX POLICY CTR., TAX POLICY
AND I NVESTMENT BY S TARTUPS AND I NNOVATIVE F IRMS 23–25 (2015), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573259 [https://perma.cc/GM8A-LL7Y].
265. Id. at 3 (“The R&E tax credit, for example, is intended to foster innovative investment,
and the capital gains tax exemption for long-term investments in startups is intended to
encourage equity investment in new ventures.”).
266. See, e.g., Douglas J. Young & Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz, Alcohol Taxes
and Beverage Prices, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 57, 58 (2002) (“The evidence from this study
indicates that alcohol taxes are over-shifted to consumers. For example, the Federal excise
tax on beer increased by $9 per barrel in 1991. It is estimated to have increased retail prices by
$15 to $17.”).
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technical question that is beyond the scope of this Article. On the one
hand, taxing larger firms could give smaller firms a cost advantage. On
the other hand, larger firms tend to have more market power, and market
power allows firms to pass on the tax burden to consumers.267 Whether
or not a tax on incumbents will increase social welfare in highly regulated
industries is a question that must be answered empirically and specifically
in each different market.
There are practical problems with any tax regime that is designed to
encourage entrepreneurial innovation. How does one determine which entities
shall be taxed? Any line-drawing between the taxed and the untaxed invites
firms to change their behavior to avoid being taxed.268 This is inefficient
in that it may require firms to produce a suboptimal amount of output or
to engage in other gamesmanship.269
Moreover, the utility of tax credits is limited for startups whose business
model does not contemplate being profitable for several years.270 Tax
credits for startups are only useful when a startup is incurring tax liability.271
Tax liability arises from profits, but startups are often unprofitable in their
formative years.272 Some “startups” remain unprofitable for over a decade
and remain unprofitable even when they have grown so large as to be better
seen as incumbents.273 Indeed, some have opined that the hallmark of a
high-growth startup is its ability to channel all potential profits into
accelerating growth.274
Accordingly, whether or not compensatory tax instruments will encourage
entrepreneurial innovation remains an open question. On the one hand, it
267. See Clemens Fuest, Dominik Schober & Oliver Woll, Does Market Power Allow
Firms to Pass on More of the Tax Burden to Consumers? Evidence from Gasoline Tax
Reforms in Austria, 108 NAT’L TAX ANN’S ANN. CONF. ON TAXATION PROC. 1, 1 (2005),
https://ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/2015/139-fuest-schober-woll-marketpower-allow-firms-pass.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8HK-24T7].
268. Cf. Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 693, 702 (2010).
269. See, e.g., id. at 707.
270. See Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms,
69 TAX L. REV. 357, 357–59 (2016).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See, e.g., Seth Fiegerman, Twitter Records Its First Annual Profit, but It Is
Losing Millions of Users, CNN BUS.: MKTS NOW (Feb. 7, 2019, 1:20 PM), http://
cnn.com/2019/02/07/tech/twitter-earnings-q4/index.html [https://perma.cc/24H2-WPKQ].
For example, Twitter turned its first annual profit in 2018, eleven years after it was
incorporated on April 19, 2007. See id.; Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Twitter,
Inc., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/141
8091/000119312513390321/d564001dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/2YCM-E4MQ].
274. See Alison Coleman, Profitability Versus Growth: A Balancing Act, FORBES
(Mar. 4, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://forbes.com/sites/alisoncoleman/2018/03/04/profitabilityversus-growth-a-balancing-act-for-startups/#6f794a1d3e3e [https://perma.cc/Z5UL-HA4G].
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is theoretically possible to use taxes to discourage monopoly and encourage
competition.275 On the other hand, calculating the appropriate tax rate is
both an art and a science. We might be skeptical that regulators or lawmakers
who impose these tax policies design efficient equations, especially where
they may be influenced—or even captured276—by the incumbents in that
regulated industry.277
D. Deregulation?
Deregulation is an obvious solution to the problems of regulation. Of
course, regulations exist for theoretical reasons such as fostering public
interests and enforcing market discipline, although these theories have
also been questioned in the literature.278 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to discuss whether regulation or deregulation is generally preferable.
However, this Article can shed light on the debate, as its finding of the
emergence of RD impacts analysis of the cost of regulation.
There are two main schools of thought when it comes to deregulation.
The more extreme school advocates for total deregulation.279 The more
moderate school advocates for deregulating small firms. This moderate
regulatory philosophy was expressed in legislation through the Small Business

275. But see Casey Mulligan, Monopolies Are Unhealthy but High Taxes Make the
Disease Worse, HILL (Mar. 30, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/381001monopolies-are-unhealthy-but-taxes-make-the-disease-worse [https://perma.cc/K2YG-SVUG].
276. Regulatory capture is a state of affairs where a legislature or administrative
agency regulates in an industry’s interest, as opposed to regulating in the public interest.
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 595, 644 (1995). “A lawmaker is captured when it chooses ‘a policy which
would not be ratified by an informed polity free of organization costs.’” Id. (quoting Michael
Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 167, 178 (1990)).
277. See, e.g., supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 439,
443 (2005). Regulation versus deregulation of businesses is a broad debate that connects
in some ways to the even larger issue of the trade-off between dictatorship and disorder.
Whether regulations increase or decrease social welfare may be a function of the nature of
the activity being regulated and the characteristics of the society in which the regulation
takes place. See id. Moreover, there is scholarly disagreement about whether efficiency
is even the right metric to use when evaluating whether more or less regulation is desirable.
Other metrics may include justice, stability, or perceptions of fairness. See id.
279. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues
of Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 516 (2012).

803

ORANBURG_57-3_PRE_ORANBURG_PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

10/16/2020 11:51 AM

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.280 Government regulators often
exclude or exempt small businesses from a number of regulations.281 These
exemptions include securities registration and reporting requirements,282
labor and employment rules,283 as well as health and safety guidelines.284
But such small business exemptions do not solve the problem. For one
thing, small businesses must expend costs to determine whether the exclusionary
rule applies to them.285 As these exclusionary rules change, small firms
must continue to expend resources to stay abreast of those changes. Third
parties must also expend resources to determine whether a firm they are
dealing with is regulated or exempt.286
Perhaps more problematically, small firms may change their behavior
in otherwise inefficient ways in order to fit into the exemption.287 For example,
a small business may choose not to hire an additional worker in order to
stay under the limit for mandatory provision of health insurance.288 Likewise,
280. See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2018). Some scholars have written specifically on the
misguided nature of that act. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case
Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998).
281. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions,
98 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1065–86 (2013) (outlining small business deregulation in various
areas of the law).
282. See, e.g., Emerging Growth Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
(July 24, 2019), https://sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC [https://perma.cc/9S5WMYUC] (“If your company qualifies as an ‘emerging growth company’ as defined in
Section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act, it may choose to follow disclosure requirements
that are scaled for newly public companies.”).
283. See, e.g., Family Help, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/family-help [https://perma.cc/PPU2-3CYN
(describing Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) exemptions for small family-run
businesses).
284. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1904.1 (2019) (describing OSHA rule exemptions for
employers with less than ten employees).
285. Cf., e.g., Allen Smith, Weigh Risks in Using FFCRA’s Small-Business Exemption,
Soc’y for Hum. Resource Mgmt. (May 1, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/
legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/coronavirus-ffcra-small-business-exemption.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7239-GGX6].
286. See C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small
Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 25 (2004)
(“[E]xemptions sometimes increase the information costs of unregulated third parties who
may need to distinguish between regulated and unregulated firms.”).
287. See id. (“Exemptions also encourage wasteful strategic behavior by firms seeking to
avoid regulation.”).
288. See William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, The Affordable Care Act and
the Growth of Involuntary Part-Time Employment, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 955, 955–
56 (2019) (“At its passage, the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) required that firms with
50 or more employees provide health insurance for their full-time workers or be subjected
to penalties beginning in 2014. Many analysts argued that the law created incentives for
large firms to shift from full-time to part-time workers to escape the penalties and the cost
of providing health insurance.”).
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many firms hire part-time employees to work thirty hours per week or less
to avoid paying for employee benefits.289 Some have even argued that this
artificial bifurcation between regulated and exempt firms is an immoral
double standard.290
Others have argued that the seemingly moderate position of deregulating
small firms is foolish; rather, they argue that the better approach is a sweeping
reduction of regulations for all firms, which can best be summed up in the
phrase “Deregulate Now!”291 It is simply beyond the scope of this Article
to address in any meaningful way the arguments for and against sweeping
deregulation. Of course, deregulation would eliminate many of the problems
with regulations. However, many would argue that regulations exist for a
reason. Others would counter-argue that those reasons are primarily based
on power and politics.
For the instant purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to resolve the
regulation versus deregulation debate writ large. Rather, the Article’s
contribution is that not all regulation is created equal. Granting broad
discretion to regulators through vague standards may have more negative
289. Kara E Shae, Risks of ACA Avoidance Strategies for Employers, HR DAILY
ADVISOR (Nov. 1, 2013), https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2013/11/01/risks-of-aca-avoidance
[https://perma.cc/EG8D-4FXE] (“Already, several ACA avoidance strategies, including layoffs,
downsizing . . . moving employees from full- to part-time status, and replacing employees
with a contract workforce, have made headlines.”). Under ObamaCare, the hourly threshold to
be considered “full-time” is thirty hours. See Cynthia J. Borrelli, Affordable Care Act
Compliance from the Employer’s Perspective, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2016, at 35, 35 (“A fulltime employee is an individual employed at least 30 hours per week, on average.”).
290. See, e.g., Ruben H. Arredondo, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Balancing
the Treatment of Employers and Employees in Employment Discrimination Cases in
Courts within the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 261, 285 (2002) (“As
a practical matter, state and federal legislation have different protections for workers employed
by small businesses and those employed by larger employers, which is essentially a double
standard. As a policy matter, it sends a message that though elimination of workplace
discrimination is important for some of the workforce, it is not important enough to cover
the entire workforce.”); Seth C. Oranburg, Unbundling Employment: Flexible Benefits for
the Gig Economy, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2018).
291. See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 279, at 495 (The “[Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act]’s [(PPACA)] fundamental design defect was to superimpose
additional layers of regulation and subsidies on a system that was already top-heavy with
both. These preexisting regulations and subsidies have already misaligned the incentives
within the health care system. The next generation of rules will only compound the errors.
In our view, the right approach to these problems is to promptly initiate a program of systematic
deregulation that will introduce the choice and competition to which PPACA gives, at
best, lip service.”); Richard A. Epstein, Deregulate Now, HOOVER DIGEST (Apr. 21, 2010),
https://www.hoover.org/research/deregulate-now [https://perma.cc/5N3M-9KQE].
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consequences for entrepreneurial innovation than instituting rules that apply
equally and straightforwardly to all firms. According to RD, deregulatory efforts
should focus on identifying regulations where regulators have too much
discretion.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Most scholars agree that regulation is at odds with innovation.292 Some
have even described innovation as a square peg that does not fit in the
round hole of regulation.293 But this Article hoped to show that not all
regulations are created equal. A more nuanced view of regulatory regimes,
using the axes of rules versus standards and simplicity versus complexity,
can shed light onto the design of optimal regulations.
This Article has shown how startups are creating RD technologies that
help other startups and small businesses comply with regulations. This
changes the regulatory landscape by leveling the playing field for entrepreneurial
innovation. Future studies of the impact of regulation should consider how
RD may change the incidence of regulatory cost on startups and small
businesses.
Moreover, this positive observation leads to normative policy suggestions.
In particular, regulators should consider the nature of the regulation in
addition to the amount of regulation. Regulations that have a vague, standardlike nature are more likely to have a disparate impact on small businesses,
whereas regulations that can be addressed by computers may not depress
entrepreneurial innovation as much.
Entrepreneurs face many barriers to entry, but regulators should be particularly
concerned about regulatory barriers to entry, as this is something ostensibly
in their direct control. If business regulations can be designed more efficiently,
should they not be? This Article hoped to show how regulatory rules might
be better than regulatory standards insofar as rules are more compatible
with technological solutions, such that rule makers should try to craft rules
that can be addressed by RD solutions.
I termed this process regulatory democratization because democratization
is the action of making something accessible to everyone.294 Likewise,
RD firms make regulatory compliance accessible for a wider range of startups
and small businesses. Lowering the cost of regulatory compliance makes
292. See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal & Robert N. Farris, Innovation and Legislation: The
Changing Relationship—Evidence from 1984 to 2015, 58 JURIMETRICS J.L., SCI., & TECH.
303, 304 (2017).
293. See Mark Lavender, Regulating Innovative Medicine: Fitting Square Pegs in Round
Holes, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH REV. 1, 2, https://dltr.law.duke.edu/2005/01/13/regulatinginnovative-medicine-fitting-square-pegs-in-round-holes/ [https://perma.cc/6KPJ-3DKU].
294. See Democratization, OXFORD ENGL. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014).
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it easier for more businesses to enter regulated markets. RD firms lower
the cost of regulatory compliance by creating new technological products
and services that solve regulatory problems for a large number of other
startups and small businesses. Theoretically, the result of this process
is a more competitive and therefore efficient market, despite a high degree
of regulation.
This finding counsels against the idea that regulatory inefficiency should
be remedied with additional regulatory apparatuses.295 A priori, the notion
that more regulations will solve the problems caused by regulations does
not make sense.296 Moreover, this Article has shown that increasing regulatory
discretion—via regulatory sandboxes—is likely to further depress
entrepreneurial innovation from small and young firms.
Indeed, it may be the case that the best regulatory solution is no solution.
RD occurs where the free market, powered by technology, solves regulatory
problems on its own.
This theory should be tested empirically. Fortunately, on the horizon
are new tools for measuring the impact of regulation.297 This Article theorized
that rules and standards may have a different impact on regulation, especially
as a function of firm size and age, and these variables should be considered
in empirical analysis of regulation.
There is much more to learn and understand about the relationship
between regulation and entrepreneurial innovation. The finding of RD shows
that regulations have complex impacts on startup decision-making, but what
are the individual, environmental, and industry conditions that will impact
an entrepreneur’s decision to create a RD solution? How does RD impact
entry, form, and performance in regulated markets? What is the impact of
regulatory democratization on net social welfare? The Author hopes this

295. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 10, at 886–87 (“Our economy and society as a whole
lose when innovations are placed on hold or barred from entering the marketplace. It
reflects poorly on the government when its action might be one of the reasons for this
outcome.”).
296. See id. at 865.
297. See Michael Simkovic & Miao Ben Zhang, Measuring Regulation 1 (Univ. of
S. Cal. Law Sch., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 298, 2019), https://law.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1433&context=usclwps-lss [https://perma.cc/B2VX-C9KQ].
For example, Michael Simkovic and Miao Ben Zhang developed a new method to measure
the intensity of regulation. See id. The availability of their Regulation Index and others’
efforts to make regulatory impact quantifiable may help researchers conduct empirical
analysis on the impact of regulation on entrepreneurial innovation. See id.
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Article inspires other scholars to challenge the ideas stated herein and move
us closer to a theory of optimal regulation.
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